The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has defined trade secret as “any confidential business information which provides an enterprise a competitive edge. The unauthorized use of such information by persons other than the holder is regarded as an unfair practice and a violation of the trade secret”‘[1] When compared to other types of intellectual property, the ambit and scope given to the protection of trade secrets is very wide. It can range from technical and scientific information to commercial and financial information, recipes, algorithms, customer lists, etc. Further, the scope is so wide that even ‘negative’ information such as abandoned solutions and research done without any conclusions can be protected as a trade secret. It is important to note that trade secrets are also covered under the TRIPS agreement. However, the TRIPS agreement, in Article 39, uses the term “undisclosed information” as a substitute for the traditional “trade secrets”. The TRIPS agreement has even gone on to state the essentials of an undisclosed information, i.e., the information is secret, due to the secrecy, it has a commercial value and that the secret has been subject to reasonable steps to keep it a secret by the holder of such secret. Even before the TRIPS agreement came in effect, India, in its discussion paper at the 1989 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade meeting, stated that it did not consider trade secret to be an intellectual property right. The reasoning cited was that trade secrets relied on secrecy and confidentiality, unlike other intellectual property that depend on publication, registration and knowledge of the general public. The discussion paper further stated that protection of such confidential information should be governed by contracts and civil law.[2] The Delhi High Court has defined trade secret as “formulae, technical know-how or a method of business adopted by an employer which is unknown to others “[3]. In Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Mehar Karan Singh, the Bombay High Court has used the following six factors to determine whether information under consideration qualified for trade secret protection[4] One of the most important judgments on the topic of trade secret protection came in the case of Diljeet Titus v. Alfred Adevare & Ors[5]. In this case, it was held that “the court has an obligation to stop a breach of confidence from happening and such obligation is independent of any other right”. Therefore, it can be inferred that the trade secret protection does not come from the holder having a right per se, but also from the obligation to maintain confidentiality due to the nature of trade secrets. Here, it is important to note that there is no straitjacket formula when it comes to protection of trade secrets each case will be looked at through the telescope of its own specific merits, facts and circumstances under contract law, copyright law or other applicable law. With the growth of innovative and unconventional intellectual property, the protection of trade secrets is becoming increasingly important. As can be seen from the above, while India does not have a specific statute in place, the judiciary has again stepped up to the plate and shown positive intent in protecting confidential information which has clearly come as a relief to many businesses whose success relies upon family secrets passed on from one generation to other. Furthermore, keeping in mind the recent Huawei case and the fact that the USA is constantly urging countries to enact statutes for trade secret protection, it won’t be an exaggeration to say that India may very soon see a statute aimed specifically at protection of confidential information/trade secrets. However, till then, let’s just keep it a well-kept secret! [1] “What is a Trade Secret?”, available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm (viewed on 6-02-2018) [2] Pratik Das, India’s protection to secrets of trade, available at http://www.khuranaandkhurana.com/2017/08/26/indias-protection-to-secrets-of-trade/#_edn5 (viewed on 31-03-2018) [3] American Express Bank Ltd. v. Priya Puri, (2006) IIILLJ 540 Del [4]2010 (112) BOM LR 3759 [5]2006(32) PTC609(Del)

On February 20, 2020, the Controller General of Patent, Design and TradeMarks issued a public notice that indicates steps being taken to further streamline the Registry’s functioning. These changes are a direct result of the suggestions made at stakeholder meetings held in Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai. Some key steps/proposed steps are as follows: The public notice also puts current timelines in perspective. For instance, presently, examination of an application takes less than a month and replies to Examination Reports are processed within around one (1) to two (2) months. Moreover, the pendency in issuance of registration certificates, processing of renewal requests and post registration amendments has also been reduced to a large extent. All in all, the Public Notice encapsulates the progress being made to make the Registry a world-class institution. Such progress encourages both Indian and foreign businesses to consider investing in protection of their brand names and effectively realizing their brand values in India.

The Patents Act, 1970 (“Act”) includes a computer programme per se as a non-patentable invention. The patentability of Computer Related Inventions (“CRIs”) or software patents has always been much discussed issue in India. In this regard, the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ferid Allani v. Union of India and Ors. (Order dated December 12, 2019 W.P.(C) 7/2014 & CM APPL. 40736/2019) is instructive. Ferid Allani, a citizen of Tunisia, had filed an Indian National Phase patent application for method and device claims relating to “accessing information sources and services on the web”. Mr. Allani had submitted that the objective of the invention is to provide a method and corresponding device for accessing information sources and services on the web. He contended that his invention was quicker and easier to use than the methods known at the time. As a result, the invention provides a technical effect and requires integration with hardware. However, the application was rejected by the Indian Patent Office (“IPO”) stating that the subject matter of the application is not patentable under the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the IPO, Mr. Allani filed an appeal at the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (“IPAB”). However, the IPAB turned down the appeal stating that the application fails to disclose any technical effect or technical advancement. Ultimately, a writ petition was filed before Delhi High Court challenging the orders of IPO and the IPAB. In the writ petition, it was claimed that Mr. Allani’s invention is more than a mere computer programme that is loaded onto the computer and the application does disclose a technical effect and technical advancement. The Court observed that “In today’s digital world, when most inventions are based on computer programs, it would be retrograde to argue that all such inventions would not be patentable. Innovation in the field of artificial intelligence, blockchain technologies and other digital products would be based on computer programs, however, the same would not become nonpatentable inventions – simply for that reason. It is rare to see a product which is not based on a computer program. Whether they are cars and other automobiles, microwave ovens, washing machines, refrigerators, they all have some sort of computer programs in-built in them. Thus, the effect that such programs produce including in digital and electronic products is crucial in determining the test of patentability.” The Court observed that “the words ‘per se’ were incorporated in Act so as to ensure that genuine inventions which are developed based on computer programs, are not refused patents”. The Court held that in light of the amendments to the guidelines with respect to CRIs and the judicial precedents in this regard, since 2013, the meaning of ‘technical effect’ has been clearly defined. Further, the Court observed that, for the test of patentability, it is crucial to determine the effect which a computer program produces; and held that if an invention demonstrates a “technical effect” or “technical contribution” it is patentable even though it may be based on a computer program. Lastly, the Court directed the IPO to re-examine Mr. Allani’s application in the light of the observations made in its order, the judicial precedents, the guidelines and the settled practices of the IPO.

Recently in Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. FAO(OS) 133/2019 and CM APPL. 32954/2019, while setting aside a Single Judge decision, a two-judge bench addressed key issues concerning e-commerce portals and Direct Selling Entities (“DSE”) such as Amway. Amway India Enterprises Private Limited and other DSEs (“Plaintiffs/Respondents”) had filed a suit against the Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. and others (“Defendants/Appellants”) for selling the Plaintiff’s goods in violation of Direct Selling Guidelines (“DSG”). As explained in our blog post at https://sc-ip.in/2019/08/14/major-indian-e-commerce-platforms-prohibited-from-selling-amway-modicare-and-oriflame-products/, a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that the Defendants were prohibited from selling goods of DSEs. An appeal followed. The two-judge bench was of the view that intermediaries/ e-commerce websites are not under any obligation to ensure that the products of DSEs are sold only after their authorization. This is so because the DSG are merely model guidelines of ‘advisory’ nature issued by the Government of India. The court observed that Single Judge bench had committed a fundamental error in framing the first issue as “whether the DSG are valid and binding on the Defendants”. According to the learned judges, the Single Judge ought to have first considered whether the DSG were indeed ‘law’ and whether suits seeking enforcement of such guidelines are maintainable?’ As per the court, the DSG were not an ‘executive instructions’ which could have been made enforceable under Articles 73 and 77 of the Constitution. Rather the notification issued by the Government of India states that they are merely guidelines of advisory nature that could not be traced to any statutes or rules, in particular, the Consumer Protection Act, 1956, (“CPA”). The court then examined whether the Appellants qualify as an ‘intermediaries’, and are entitled to protection under the safe harbour provision within meaning of Section 79 (read with Section 2 (1) (w)) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). The court noted that this was a disputed question of fact as the Respondents were themselves not sure about their stand in their pleadings. Therefore, this issue is a matter of trial. Further, the court noted that the burden of proof shifts to the Respondents to prove that the Appellants are intermediaries. While making this observation regarding burden of proof, the court relied on Myspace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. (2017) 236 DLT 478 (DB), in which it was held that Section 79 of the IT Act is not an “enforceable provision”, but merely provides an “affirmative defence” to entities which fulfil the criteria set forth under Section 79 of the IT Act. The court further held that, assuming the Appellants were intermediaries under the IT Act, the distinction drawn by the Single Judge between active and passive intermediaries so far as the availability of the safe harbour provisions are concerned was erroneous and illogical. The court held that Appellants are entitled to the benefits of safe harbour as they fulfil the criteria listed under Section 79 (2) (b) of the IT Act. Meaning thereby, the Appellants have clearly established that they (i) do not initiate the transmission (ii) do not select the receiver of the transmission and (iii) do not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. Further, Section 2 (1) (w) of the IT Act does envisage that such intermediaries could provide value-added services to third party sellers and same is also buttressed by Press Note No. 2 issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In particular, reference is made to para 5.2.15.2.4 (vi), which reads as under: ―”In marketplace model goods/services made available for sale electronically on website should clearly provide name, address and other contact details of the seller, post sales, delivery of goods to the customers and customer satisfaction will be responsibility of the seller.” As regards the Intermediaries Guidelines, the court reiterated the law laid down by the top court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, that an online platform’s obligation to remove content arises only if there is a court order or a notification from a government agency on the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2). An allegation from the DSE without the support of court order will not trigger the takedown obligation. The Single-Judge bench had found the Appellants to be guilty of infringement, dilution and passing-off, etc. The two-judge bench, on the other hand, found that the Respondents had not asserted or even mentioned anything about trademark registration in the plaint. It said, “there was no occasion for the Plaintiffs to assert ownership of such trademarks. In fact, there is no such pleading to that effect at all. How the Single Judge could have come to such a conclusion and, that too, in a categorical manner, in the absence of any pleading, is a mystery.” Further the court relied on the decision of Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung Electronics Company Limited, in which it was held that once the goods have been lawfully acquired, if they are put into market and further sold, there would be no infringement of the trademark irrespective of the fact that whether such a market is an international market or a domestic market. Lastly, the court declined the Respondent’s argument that the Appellant had indulged in sale of tampered, damaged and in-genuine sale of the Respondent’s goods and held that that there was no material at the prima facie stage to conclude as such. These findings must await a trial.

The commercialization of Internet affects all aspects modern life. Now-a-days video bloggers and social media influencers give online marketing another dimension and hold enough influence to make a substantial impact in making or breaking of a brand name and its value. Such massive societal influence inevitably necessitates that the judiciary is on its toes. A recent example is Marico Limited v. Abhijeet Bhansali COMIP No. 596 of 2019. In this case, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court dealt with the issue of disparagement of PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL by Abhijeet Bhansali, a/k/a Bearded Chokra, a popular video blogger/social media influencer who produces and uploads videos featuring reviews of products of various manufacturers on his YouTube channel. The Defendant uploaded a video (“Impugned Video”) containing allegedly disparaging remarks about the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL. The Impugned Video featured, inter alia, a comparison drawn between the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL and another product, labelled as “Organic Coconut Oil” by the Defendant. This another product was, in fact, virgin coconut oil, which is classified, under the Food Regulations 2017, in a different category as compared to regular coconut oil. In the Impugned Video, the Defendant conducted a test comparing the two products without clearly informing the viewers that the rival products, in fact, were classified in different categories. The Defendant went on to give a verdict in his video concluding that PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL is not the right choice for a consumer. The Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the Defendant from publishing or broadcasting or communicating to the public, the Impugned Video; disparaging or denigrating the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL product and infringing the Plaintiff’s registered trademark, namely, PARACHUTE. The Defendant contended, inter alia, that the Impugned Video was intended to educate viewers and express his bona fide opinion. The Plaintiff argued that the Impugned Video was intended to malign the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL. Further, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant, purposely and knowingly, misrepresented to the viewers that he was comparing the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL with organic coconut oil when he was actually comparing it with virgin coconut oil. The Plaintiff submitted data that supported the contention that there was no major variance in the nutrition value of the rival products. Observing that a social media influencer who has or claims to have a sound knowledge on a particular subject matter has the power to influence people, the Hon’ble Court held that this power ought to be exercised carefully. The Defendant being aware of his influence as a social media influencer with a follower base and a degree of credibility could not deliver statements with the same impunity as an ordinary person. Placing reliance on a Division Bench decision in Gujarat Co-operative v. Hindustan Unilever the court held that intent; manner; and the message sought to be conveyed were the three parameters of determining whether a case of disparagement or denigration can be made out against the Defendant. The Court ruled that the Impugned Video was not an educative video in respect of coconut oils, but a video targeted at the Plaintiff’s PARACHUTE COCONUT OIL. The manner in which the Impugned Video portrayed the Plaintiff’s product and the message sought to be conveyed were held to be denigrating in nature. Thus, it was held that the Impugned Video was hit by all three of the above-noted factors. After a detailed discussion and analysis on the law of disparagement in view of the factual matrix of the case and the significant role played by social medial influencers and video bloggers in the world of marketing and advertising, the court ordered the Defendant to take down the Impugned Video, pending hearing and final disposal of the suit.

On September 27, 2019, after a court-room battle of eight (8) long years, Suneel Darshan, a producer and director in the Indian movie industry, also known for movies like Andaaz and Barsaat, emerged victorious against the Internet giant Google, and its video sharing website Youtube, in a suit for copyright infringement. In M/s Shri Krishna International etc. v. Google India Pvt. Ltd. and others, Darshan, proprietor of Shree Krishna International (“Plaintiff”), a production company, initiated the instant suit against Google Inc., a US company, its Indian subsidiary, Google India Pvt. Ltd. and Youtube LLC (collectively “the Defendants”), before District Court of Gurugram. Darshan prayed for a permanent injunction, damages and accounts Allegedly, the Defendants, the owners and operators of www.youtube.com, were intentionally exploiting and misappropriating the valuable intellectual property of the Plaintiff, primarily the copyright in Plaintiff’s cinematograph films, audio-visual songs, sound recording including the underlying literary & musical works (collectively “Works”). The Works were being uploaded on www.youtube.com and downloaded by users using a facility called “Youtube Downloader” without obtaining any permission or consent from the Plaintiff. These activities of Defendants resulted into huge financial loss to the Plaintiff as most of the revenue earned by Plaintiff comes from its films, their content such as songs, etc. Relying on MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassette’s (CS(OS)2682/2008), the Defendants argued that, being intermediaries/service providers under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”), they had no control over the user generated content and, therefore, could not be held liable for copyright infringement as alleged by Plaintiff. Dispensing with the requirement of the specific knowledge of infringing content, the court held that once the Defendants were aware of the title of works of Plaintiff, it was upon them to locate the URL’s and take down the allegedly infringing content. Also, the Court discarded the Defendant’s argument that proper take-down request procedure, with specifications of the specific URLs which are being claimed to have been infringing was not complied with or produced, is sufficient to render this claim of infringement invalid. Though the case is not clear as to whether any formal steps were fulfilled by the copyright owner to satisfy the Notice and Takedown procedure, it certainly relaxes the ‘actual knowledge’ standard enunciated in My Space. The Defendants have appealed the order in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and it will be interesting to see which way the High Court decides.

Recently the Advocate General (AG) of the European Court of Justice rendered an opinion in the case of Sky Plc & Ors. v. Sky Kick UK Ltd. & Anr, C‑371/18 (hereinafter referred to as the “Sky Case”). It is noteworthy that certain issues in the Sky Case were considered by the Supreme Court of India in the 1996 judgment of Vishnudas Trading as Vishnudas Kishandas v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., Hyderabad and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2275. (“the Charminar case”) In the Sky Case, Sky PLC (“Plaintiff”), the owner of SKY-formative trademarks in relation to television broadcasting, telephony and broadband, alleged trademark infringement by Sky Kick UK Ltd (“Defendant”), user of SKY-KICK and SKY-KICK formative marks in relation to email migration or cloud backup services. The Defendant sought to invalidate the Plaintiff’s EU registrations on the ground that the specifications of goods and services covered by these registrations lacked clarity and precision and that the Plaintiff had obtained these registrations in bad faith. The AG held as follows: A review of Indian jurisprudence reveals that, in the 1996 Charminar case, the Supreme Court of India had also held that trader or manufacturer who deals only in one or more of the articles falling under the broad classification of goods and services without a bona fide intention to use the mark on or in relation to all goods and services should not be allowed to enjoy monopoly over the entire set of goods and services. Therefore, it is possible, under Indian law, to partially cancel a registration on the ground of partial bad faith of the registrant. Moreover, just like the European Union, the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not provide any grounds for cancellation of a trademark registration based on insufficient clarity and precision of the specification of the goods and services for which the mark is registered. The 1996 Charminar case has been followed in numerous cases, most pertinently, in the case of Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Co-Operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd, AIR 2018 SC 3516. In this case, the Supreme Court reiterated its decision that the owner of the prior registered mark NANDINI Device cannot be allowed to enjoy monopoly over the entire class of goods, as it dealt only in milk and milk products, and had no intention to expand its business to other goods belonging to that class.

On October 24, 2019, the EU General Court ruled that the popular RUBIK’s Cube toy puzzle does not meet the requirements for registration as a three-dimensional trade mark. The path leading up to the decision was long and dramatic! It all started in 2006 when Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG (“Simba Toys”), a German toy manufacturer, filed an application at the European Union Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO”) asking for a declaration of invalidity of Rubik’s Brand Ltd.’s EU registration for the RUBIK’s Cube 3D trade mark (shown below). Simba Toys contended that, since the RUBIK’s Cube involved a technical solution consisting of its rotating capability, it may be protected only by a patent and not as a trade mark. The EUIPO rejected Simba Toys’ above-noted application. Simba Toys filed an action before the EU General Court seeking annulment of the EUIPO’s decision. On November 25, 2014, the EU General Court dismissed the action on the ground that the essential features of the RUBIK’s Cube toy puzzle did not perform any technical function. Simba Toys appealed to the EU Court of Justice, which, for the first time, ruled in its favour by annulling the EUIPO’s decision. It reasoned that the non-visible functional elements of the toy puzzle represented by the shape should have also been taken into consideration during an examination of whether the cube shape involves a technical solution. Further to this decision rendered by the EU Court of Justice, the EUIPO declared the registration for the RUBIK’s Cube 3D trademark as invalid. Rubik’s Brand Ltd. then challenged the EUIPO’s decision before the EU General Court, but was unsuccessful. The EU General Court reasoned that the essential characteristics of the RUBIK’s toy cube puzzle are limited to its cube shape and the black lines and squares on each face of the cube. These were deemed necessary by the EU General Court to obtain the intended technical result. The colour differences on the faces of the cube do not, however, constitute an essential characteristic, since the trade mark as registered did not have a colour claim, and consequently, it did not suggest any colour differences. The EU General Court further opined that, while examining whether the cube shape involves a technical solution, mechanisms that are not visible in the graphic representation of the mark should also be taken into consideration to assess functionality. On this basis, the EU General Court upheld the EUIPO’s decision. The dispute may not be over yet as Rubik’s Brand Ltd. is entitled to appeal the decision. Time will tell what happens in this dispute! Citation: Rubik’s Brand Ltd. v. EUIPO and Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG, judgment dated 24.10.2019 of the EU General Court in Case T-601/17

Recently in Make My Trip (India) Private Limited vs. Make My Travel (India) Private Limited CS(COMM) 889/2018, I.As. 6896/2018 & 8837/2018, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court discussed the ‘doctrine of acquiescence” under the law on trade marks. The Plaintiff, Make My Trip (India) Private Limited, filed a suit against use of the marks MAKE MY TRAVEL and MMT, the tag line DREAMS UNLIMITED and a logo mark by the Defendant, Make My Travel (India) Private Limited. The Plaintiff alleged trade mark infringement and passing-off on the basis of its statutory and common law rights in the trade marks MAKE MY TRIP, MMT and the taglines ‘Memories Unlimited’ and ‘Hotels Unlimited’. The Defendant alleged that there had been email exchanges and business transactions between the Plaintiff and the Defendant during the period 2011 to 2017, and the Plaintiff was aware of the use of the Defendant’s use of marks MAKE MY TRAVEL and MMT, the tag line DREAMS UNLIMITED and a logo mark. Hence, Plaintiff has acquiesced the use of these marks by the Defendant for continuous period of five years. On the basis of this, the Defendant contented that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the claimed relief. The court cited to Hindustan Pencils Private Limited v. India Stationary Products Co. AIR 1990 Del 19, in which it was held that in order to claim the defense of acquiescence, there should be a tacit or an express assent by a plaintiff to a defendant’s use of a mark, with the plaintiff encouraging the defendant to continue such use. There should be an impression that the plaintiff does not regard the defendant’s as being violative of the plaintiff’s rights. The court also cited to Emcure Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. 2014 SCC Online Bom 1064, in which it was held that a mere failure to sue without a positive act of encouragement is no defense, and would not constitute acquiescence. The court was of the opinion that acquiescence is sitting by when another invades your rights and spends money in the doing of it. Acquiescence is not mere negligence or oversight. There must be an abandonment of the right to exclusivity. Based on the above, the court observed that, based on the communication between the Defendant and booking customer care executive and/or franchisee of the Plaintiff, the positive knowledge of use of the marks above marks by the Defendant cannot be imputed to the management or any key managerial personnel of the Plaintiff. It cannot be accepted that the Plaintiff has acquiesced the use of the marks by the Defendant. The court also found that the act of booking customer care executive of the Defendant who apparently did not have knowledge of the intellectual property rights of the Plaintiff did not, through his positive acts, induce an encouragement towards the Defendant to do business under above-mentioned marks. Thus, in a plea of the acquiescence, the burden of proof is always on a higher pedestal and a defendant shall require to dispense with it positively. In addition, a defendant must also require to show its good faith in adoption of the conflicting trade mark before it raises a defense of acquiescence.

The advent of Trade Mark Rules in 2017 (“Rules) has seen many positive changes at the Trade Marks Registry (“Registry”). The objective of the Rules was simplification and digitization of the registration process, and it appears that the functioning of the Registry has improved significantly to move in the direction of meeting those objectives. For years the Registry worked at a very slow pace and it was often the case that applications languished for years and, in some cases, decades. The tardy pace of examination and advancement of applications in the registration process is history now. In recent times, Applicants have witnessed record examination times, often receiving an Examination Report within weeks of filings. In fact, since 2017, many applications have matured to registration less than one (1) year after filing. Moreover, the quality of examination has improved significantly! On the subject of quality, very recently, the Delhi High Court, in Intellectual Property Attorneys Association v. The Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks & Anr., W.P.(C) 3851/2019, held that the Registrar of Trade Marks must provide reasoning for refusal/conditional acceptance of a trade mark application. It remains to be seen how this directive is implemented in practice. Expedited processing is not only limited to examination, but also to oral hearings and post-registration procedures such as renewals. As for oral hearings, although the pace at which oral hearings are scheduled has been quickened considerably, sometimes, hearing officers tend of take a rather straight-jacketed and narrow view of a case. Moreover, sometimes, the approaches taken by hearing officers to the identical issue differ. For example, in some cases, even where there is no objection against an application on the ground of lack of distinctiveness, a hearing officer might ask for an affidavit of use. Furthermore, the Registry has started conducting hearings via video conferencing. This is a very positive development. Another positive development is that the Registry requires trade mark applicants to file affidavits attesting to use of a mark in those cases where an application is based on use of a mark in India. The affidavit must be accompanied by appropriate evidence showing use of a mark as of the date of earliest use claimed in an application. Filing such affidavits has and will, undoubtedly, reduce incorrect use claims in applications. The opposition procedures at the Registry have also seen many positive developments. Service of Notices of Opposition (that sets the deadline rolling for filing a counter statement) is happening nearly contemporaneously with filing via email (as opposed to post)! Moreover, orders of abandonment are being processed very rapidly, thereby bringing closure to uncontested proceedings or proceedings that were not defended. These new procedures have helped chip away at deadwood oppositions. However, substantive hearings in opposition matters continue to lag! The efforts taken by the Registry are, undoubtedly, praiseworthy. We look forward to streamlining of procedures relating to cancellation actions as well as license recordals. In addition, we hope that, in 2020, opposition hearings will be scheduled, thereby reducing the backlog in opposition matters.