In an appeal against a Single Judge’s order denying an interim injunction, the Division Bench granted partial relief to Princeton University (“Appellant”) in its suit against The Vagdevi Educational Society and others (“Respondents”) from use of the PRINCETON mark in relation to any new institution during the pendency of the suit. The Single Judge had dismissed the Appellant’s motion for an interim injunction on the ground that the Appellant had failed to establish prior use in India and a prima facie case. The Appellant had claimed adoption of the PRINCETON mark in 1896, and use in India since 1911, based on several newspaper articles circulated in India. The Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, asserted that it adopted the PRINCETON mark as an ode to the Prince of Hyderabad for educating and grooming thousands (denoted by the word ‘ton’) and claimed continuous use of the said mark since 1991. The Single Judge had held that to show use of a mark, such use has to be shown by the proprietor itself and not by a third-party, thereby rejecting the newspaper articles as evidence of prior use relied upon by the Appellant, and holding the Respondents as the prior user of the PRINCETON mark in India. The Division Bench, on the contrary, held that the use of a mark need not be shown by the proprietor alone, and third-party references, such as newspaper articles in the present case, would suffice if they relate to the availability or performance of services under the Indian trade mark. Based on the aforesaid interpretation, the Division Bench held that the Appellant has established prior use in India going as far back as 1911 through Indian student engagement and media presence, placing it on par with a domestic trader. However, due to the Respondents’ long-standing use since 1991, the Appellant’s lack of physical presence in India, and the Respondents’ limited regional footprint, the Court denied a full injunction but restrained use of the PRINCETON mark for any new institutions during the suit’s pendency to balance equities.  The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 Read the judgement copy here.

In an appeal against a Single Judge’s order denying an interim injunction, the Division Bench granted partial relief to Princeton University (“Appellant”) in its suit against The Vagdevi Educational Society and others (“Respondents”) from use of the PRINCETON mark in relation to any new institution during the pendency of the suit. The Single Judge had dismissed the Appellant’s motion for an interim injunction on the ground that the Appellant had failed to establish prior use in India and a prima facie case. The Appellant had claimed adoption of the PRINCETON mark in 1896, and use in India since 1911, based on several newspaper articles circulated in India. The Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, asserted that it adopted the PRINCETON mark as an ode to the Prince of Hyderabad for educating and grooming thousands (denoted by the word ‘ton’) and claimed continuous use of the said mark since 1991. The Single Judge had held that to show use of a mark, such use has to be shown by the proprietor itself and not by a third-party, thereby rejecting the newspaper articles as evidence of prior use relied upon by the Appellant, and holding the Respondents as the prior user of the PRINCETON mark in India. The Division Bench, on the contrary, held that the use of a mark need not be shown by the proprietor alone, and third-party references, such as newspaper articles in the present case, would suffice if they relate to the availability or performance of services under the Indian trade mark. Based on the aforesaid interpretation, the Division Bench held that the Appellant has established prior use in India going as far back as 1911 through Indian student engagement and media presence, placing it on par with a domestic trader. However, due to the Respondents’ long-standing use since 1991, the Appellant’s lack of physical presence in India, and the Respondents’ limited regional footprint, the Court denied a full injunction but restrained use of the PRINCETON mark for any new institutions during the suit’s pendency to balance equities.  The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 Read the judgement copy here.

In a recent decision, the Delhi High Court considered an application by Honasa Consumer Limited (“Plaintiff”), proprietor of The Derma Co., seeking an interim injunction against Cloud Wellness Private Limited and its Director (“Defendants”), who market skincare products under DERMATOUCH mark with similar trade dress. The Plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and passing off, asserting that the Defendants had copied its distinctive two-tone packaging and overall trade dress used since 2020 for THE DERMA CO. branded products. It claimed that the Defendants’ use of similar orange-white, blue-white, and purple-white packaging was a slavish imitation intended to exploit the Plaintiff’s goodwill. The Defendants contended that the Plaintiff’s trade dress lacked originality, being derived from earlier brands’ designs such as Hylamide (2015), and that dual-tone packaging is common across the skincare industry. They argued that their adoption was bona fide, their products prominently bore the DERMATOUCH mark, and both parties had coexisted for over four (4) years without evidence of confusion. The court observed that consumers of dermatological products are ingredient-conscious and make purchasing decisions based on formulation and efficacy rather than packaging. It held that the marks, THE DERMA CO. and DERMATOUCH, were visually and phonetically distinct, and clearly displayed on the trade dresses, enabling consumers to distinguish between the respective products. The court further observed that the Plaintiff had failed to establish distinctiveness or secondary meaning in the claimed trade dress. Relying on Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Anchor Health and Beauty Care (P) Ltd., Kellogg Company v. Pravin Kumar Bhadabhai, and Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd., the court reiterated that colour schemes alone cannot be monopolised without clear evidence of acquired distinctiveness.   Accordingly, finding no prima facie case or likelihood of confusion, the court refused to grant interim injunction and dismissed the application, permitting the Defendants to continue business pending trial.   Honasa Consumer Limited v. Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr. [CS(COMM) 483/2025] Read the judgement copy here.  

Recently, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court directed the Trade Marks Registry (“Registry”) to remove a trade mark registration for the mark CROOSE (Stylized), owned by JNG Footstep Private Limited (“Respondent”), based on a cancellation petition filed by Crocs Inc. (“Petitioner”), based on its rights in the mark CROCS. It is the Petitioner’s case that its goods under the mark CROCS are sold worldwide, including India, since the last several years, for which it has obtained trade mark registrations. It was claimed that the lettering style used in the CROOSE (Stylized) mark is identical to that of the mark CROCS. It was further submitted that even the placement of the CROOSE (Stylized) mark on the Respondent’s products is identical to that of the mark CROCS on the Petitioner’s products. The Respondent submitted that the CROOSE (Stylized) mark is not deceptively similar to the mark CROCS as it is structurally, phonetically and visually different from the same. It was further submitted that due process was followed to obtain a registration for the CROOSE (Stylized) mark. At the outset, the court was of the view that the Petitioner being the owner of the CROCS mark is a person aggrieved and can maintain the cancellation. Further, the court, after considering the use of the CROOSE (Stylized) mark by the Respondent on its products, stated that the placement of the mark on the Respondent’s products is identical to that of the mark CROCS on the Petitioner’s products. Additionally, the overall visual and phonetic appearance of the CROOSE mark is similar to that of the mark CROCS. In light of this, the court allowed the cancellation and directed the Registry to remove the Respondent’s registration from the Trade Marks Register. Read the judgement copy here.

Recently, the Delhi High Court dismissed the application filed by Dayal Industries Private Limited (“Defendant”), seeking permission to file a rectification petition against M/s Gopika Industries’ (“Plaintiff”) registered mark DYAL. The Plaintiff filed a suit, inter alia, alleging that its mark DYAL in Class 31 (dated April 4, 1996) has been infringed by the Defendant. In its written statement, the Defendant laid down four grounds: (a) it is the prior user of DAYAL, used for cattle feed since 2000, vis-à-vis the Plaintiff whose earliest invoice is of 2001; (b) prior user rights through its flagship company, which began use of DAYAL in an allied and cognate class in 1979; (c) Defendant’s mark DAYAL is similar to DYAL; and (d) Plaintiff is attempting to ride on Defendant’s goodwill. The Defendant and its flagship company have also filed a commercial suit against the Plaintiff for infringement and passing off DAYAL. Counsel for Defendant contended that it has used DAYAL since December 5, 2000, as evidenced by a purchase order, whereas the Plaintiff’s earliest invoice dates from 2001. Though the Plaintiff’s registration is dated April 4, 1996, there is no demonstrable use till 2001. He argued that prior registration without contemporaneous use would disentitle the Plaintiff from invoking Section 34. Counsel for Plaintiff relied on Section 34 and Worknest Business Centre LLP vs. Worknests, and alleged that the Plaintiff’s correspondence with statutory departments in 1996, 1998, and 1999 shows use of DYAL. The Hon’ble High Court, relying on Worknest Business, settled that the relevant date for establishing prior use by the Defendant would be the Plaintiff’s registration date, i.e., April 4, 1996, and not the first commercial invoice, i.e., June 1, 2001. It observed that documents of the registered proprietor showing steps to commence commercial use are evidence of commercial intent. The Defendant’s claim of prior rights since 1979 was dismissed since its application claimed use since May 6, 2000, and it was not carrying out any sales under DAYAL for cattle feed. While dismissing the application, the court held that the plea of invalidity raised by the Defendant is not tenable and does not give rise to a triable issue. It clarified that these observations shall not impact the merits of pending proceedings and listed the matter on December 12, 2025. Read the Judgement copy here.

The Delhi High Court recently decided a rectification petition filed by Ardo Medical AG, seeking cancellation of the trade mark ARDO Device, subject of Registration No. 4578111, in Class 44, in the name of M/s. SDB International. The petitioner, Ardo Medical AG, a Swiss company, engaged in development, production, and distribution of products for premature babies and newborns, has been operating under its mark for over 25 years. It uses and owns registrations for its mark in multiple jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and United States since 2008, and owns and operates several country-specific domain names, along with significant global and Indian sales. The respondent, SDB International, had purchased goods from the petitioner and its distributors in India, though no formal distributorship agreement existed between the parties. Certain goods remained undelivered despite prepayment by the respondent, for which the petitioner was willing to offer a refund. In January 2025, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had registered a mark identical to the petitioner’s ARDO mark, and falsely misrepresented proprietorship over it, obtaining registration in July 2020. Believing this to be a typographical error, the petitioner approached the respondent for clarification. The petitioner was informed that its unsold stock supplied earlier was lying with the respondent, and the respondent demanded INR 20 Lakhs to assign the registration of the impugned mark to the petitioner. This conduct revealed an intent to profit unlawfully from the petitioner’s goodwill and demonstrated bad faith and constituted trade mark squatting. The respondent was unrepresented, and the court proceeded ex-parte. The court held that the petitioner was the prior user of the ARDO mark, while noting the trite law that a prior user’s rights overrides the rights of a subsequent user even though the latter’s mark may be a registered trade mark. The court observed that the respondent’s demand for an exorbitant amount of money and misrepresentation of ownership portrays bad faith and intention to extort. Further, the court observed that the respondent’s conduct reflected a deliberate act of trade mark squatting and its manipulative tactic undermines the sanctity of the Trade Marks Register. Based on the facts and analysis, the court allowed the petition and directed the Trade Marks Registry to cancel the respondent’s registration. The impugned registration stands removed from the Trade Marks Register as on date.   Ardo Medical AG vs. M/s. SDB International and Anr. [C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 92/2025] Read the judgement copy here.

Recently, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, dismissed a plea filed by Suparshva Swabs India (“Appellant”), the manufacturer of cotton buds and hygiene products, seeking, inter alia, a decree of permanent injunction restraining AGN International & Ors. (“Respondents”) from using the mark TULIP or AGN TULIP in relation to perfumes, cosmetics, and allied goods, on the grounds of trademark infringement and passing off. One of the key grounds for rejection was that the Appellant failed to establish sufficient goodwill and reputation in respect of allied and cognate goods. The Appellant contended that it has been using the mark TULIPS on and in relation to cotton pads, wet wipes, bathroom fragrances and related goods falling under the category of cosmetics and toiletries since the year 1999. The Appellant relied on its registration for the mark TULIPS in various classes, including, in Class 3, dated November 10, 2010, obtained with a user claim of February 10, 2004. Further, the Appellant asserted that its mark TULIPS has attained the status of a well-known mark. It was the Appellant’s case that the Respondents had adopted a deceptively similar mark in relation to allied and cognate goods to exploit the Appellant’s goodwill and reputation associated with the mark TULIPS. The Respondents, on the other hand, are registered proprietor and user of the mark AGN TULIP on and in relation to perfumery and personal care products. The Respondents’ registration in Class 3 is dated February 15, 2010, and was obtained on a proposed to be used basis. While determining the issue of passing off, the court observed that the fact that rival goods travel through overlapping or same trade channels such as pharmacies or supermarkets does not, by itself, establish that the reputation of the Appellant’s mark TULIPS has travelled into the field of perfumery. Just because the rival goods are displayed within the same outlet or even on the same shelf does not automatically extend goodwill across distinct product categories. The court observed that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that its mark TULIPS has acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ in relation to cosmetics or fragrances prior to 2010 nor can the mark be regarded as a “well-known mark”. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.   Suparshva Swabs India vs AGN International & Ors [FAO (COMM) 253/2023] Read the judgement copy here.

In a recent order, the Delhi High Court granted ex parte interim relief in a trademark dispute filed by Novalife Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) against Mr. Bharat Sachdeva and his associated concerns Novvalife Karnal and Novvalife Sri Ganganagar (“Defendants”), concerning the use of the mark NOVVALIFE, which is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s registered mark NOVALIFE. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff contended that the Plaintiff, engaged in migration advisory services for foreign countries, is the sole proprietor of the NOVALIFE mark and related logos, with continuous use dating back to 2016 by its predecessor, Mr. Monal Sachdeva. The Plaintiff expanded its business in 2018 to include migration consultancy services and formally incorporated Novalife Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. in 2022. The Plaintiff also secured domain names and trademark registrations for the mark, which have been recognized in the market as indicative of its services. The dispute arose when the Defendants began offering identical services under the mark NOVVALIFE and using associated domain names and trade names. The Defendants’ use of the mark, including on social media handles and websites, was found to be a slavish imitation of the Plaintiff’s platforms, replicating visual elements, structure, design, and textual content, thereby creating confusion among consumers. The Defendants were aware of the Plaintiff’s rights and goodwill, particularly given the one of the Defendant’s prior partnership with the Plaintiff’s predecessor and the explicit undertaking in the Partnership Dissolution Deed, which barred the Defendants from using the NOVALIFE mark or any similar marks. The Court observed that the Defendants’ mark was visually, phonetically, and conceptually identical to the Plaintiff’s mark, with the only difference being the additional letter “V,” which did not alter the overall commercial impression. The services offered were identical, and the trade channels and consumer base overlapped, creating a case of triple identity. The Plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement and passing off, and it was established that failure to grant interim relief would cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining the Defendants, their partners, agents, employees, and affiliates from using, offering, marketing, or advertising the mark NOVVALIFE or any similar mark, including trade names, domain names, social media handles, or logos, in relation to identical or allied services. Notices were issued to the Defendants through all permissible modes. Read the judgement copy here.

The Bombay High Court recently upheld an interim injunction granted by the District Court, Nagpur restraining Ifra Sheikh (“Appellant”) from using Mobile Bidi Traders’ (“Respondent”) registered trademark ONLINE BIDI. Before the District Court, the Respondent asserted that it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of bidis since 2005 and holds a valid trademark registration for the ONLINE BIDI mark since 2017, along with copyright registration for its label. As per the Respondent, the Appellant, who sells bidis under the mark ATM BIDI NO. 7, adopted a deceptively similar colour scheme for its packets and bundles, which is likely to cause confusion, especially among less literate consumers who rely on visual identification rather than brand names. The Appellant denied similarity between the rival products, arguing that the trade names were distinct and that the design had already been modified since a dispute was raised by the Respondent earlier. Further, the Appellant also claimed that the Respondent’s packaging failed to comply with mandatory warning requirements under the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling Rules) Rules, 2008.   The District Court, despite the objections raised by Appellant, found a prima facie case of deceptive similarity in favour of the Respondent, emphasizing on consumer confusion, and accordingly granted an interim injunction. The Appellant challenged District Court’s order by way of an appeal before the High Court. The Court affirmed the District Court’s findings that the rival products shared similarities, sufficient to cause deception. It further held that alleged non-compliance with statutory packaging requirements did not disqualify the Respondent from seeking injunction in its favour. While dismissing the appeal, the High Court noted that the orders passed by courts restraining acts of infringement and passing off, benefits not only to the owner of the trademark but also the end consumer. Read the judgement copy here.

In a recent judgment, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (“Court”) has served an important and timely reminder that damages must necessarily be based on evidence which proves that the claimant suffered actual loss, and that any calculation based on speculative assumptions would be liable to be set aside. The judgment came in an appeal by the Defendant/Appellant challenging a Trial Court decision where the Defendant’s mark “Amrit Nayan Jyoti” was found to be deceptively similar to the Respondent/Plaintiff’s registered trade mark “Nayan Jyoti”. Pursuant to an ex parte ad interim injunction, a Local Commissioner (“LC”) was also appointed by the Trial Court in the matter, who then visited the Defendant’s premises and recovered large quantities of packaging material and finished/unfinished infringing goods bearing the infringing marks. The suit, eventually, got decreed vide judgment dated January 13, 2025, in light of the Appellant consenting to suffer a decree.   Pertinently, the Trial Court found the appellant to be a ‘habitual infringer’ and found its conduct fit to be burdened with significant damages amounting to Rs. 48,35,610/-. The Trial Court calculated the damages by multiplying the quantities of products, labels, etc., seized by the LC, with the MRP of the infringing products printed on the labels, and took the resulting figure to be the Appellant’s sales for one month. It then doubled this figure for arriving at the final awarded amount on the basis of its finding that the Defendant had been selling the products at least for 2 months. The Defendant assailed the judgment in appeal before the Division Bench. While the Court dismissed the Defendant’s challenge on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, it found merit in the Defendant’s challenge to the award of damages and found the methodology employed by the Trial Court in ascertaining the quantum of damages to be woefully erroneous. The Court ruled that the burden of supporting the claim of damages with evidence of actual loss lied solely with the Plaintiff, and that no hypothetical or arbitrary estimations could be drawn by the Trial Court to fill the gaps in the plaintiff’s evidence. It observed that the Trial Court’s reliance on, and drawing assumptions on the basis of, unsubstantiated observations in the LC report, could not be said to constitute a rational basis for determining the quantum of damages. It further held that since the impugned judgment risked unjust enrichment of the Plaintiff as it lacked a reasoned evidentiary basis, it was liable to be set aside. Thus, the Court partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh determination limited to the issue of damages. The Court also granted both parties an opportunity to lead evidence in this regard. B.C. Hasaram & Sons v. Smt. Nirmala Agarwal, 2025:DHC:9867-DB Read the judgement copy here.