Recently, the High Court of Delhi, ruled in favour of Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar (“Plaintiff”) in a copyright infringement suit filed against Mr. A.R. Rahman & Ors. (“Defendants”), thereby, awarding a cost of Rs. 2 crores to the Plaintiff. It was the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendants had utilized the original composition of the Plaintiff’s father and uncle, who were popularly known as the “Junior Dagar Brothers”, in their song. The Plaintiff argued that the composition was originally composed by Junior Dagar Brothers sometime in the 1970s, and the copyright in the composition was transferred to the Plaintiff after their death. The Plaintiff claimed that after learning of the unlawful utilization, the Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Defendants regarding the alleged infringement of moral rights of Junior Dagar Brothers and copyright of the Plaintiff over the composition. In the absence of a response from the Defendants, the Plaintiff filed the present suit. On the other hand, the Defendants argued that the manner of singing, and the composition itself is not original and capable of copyright protection owing to the existence of several renditions of the same composition in the public domain. It was the Defendant’s case that there is no prima facie case of copyright infringement as there is no substantial similarity between the songs after deleting the elements which are in public domain. The court was of the opinion that the composition of Junior Dagar Brothers is an original work and is therefore entitled to copyright protection. The court opined that it is not the individual note that the composer may claim copyright on, rather, on the original expression. The court observed that while determining copyright infringement, access and substantial similarity, have to be considered. Since the access to the original composition was established by evidence and on a comparison of both the compositions, it was observed that the Defendants’ song was not merely inspired from Junior Dagar Brothers’ original composition but was in fact identical, with mere change in lyrics and other elements, a prima facie case for copyright infringement was made in this case. [Ustad Faiyaz Wasifuddin Dagar vs. Mr. A.R. Rahman & Ors. CS(COMM) 773/2023 and I.A.21148/2023] Click here to read the judgment copy

Recently, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissed an appeal challenging the constitutional validity of Section 53 of the Patents Act, 1970, and seeking an extension of the patent term. The appellants had applied for a patent in 2005, which was granted in 2012, with a 20-year validity period. The appellants initially invoked writ jurisdiction, requesting an extension of the term by 15 years as compensation for delay in the grant, and sought to rescind Section 53. The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to seek damages. Subsequent appeals and review petitions failed, culminating in the filing of the present appeal. The appellants argued that Section 53 sets the grant date from the application date, whereas Section 11A (7) provides rights from the publication date but restricts infringement proceedings until the patent is officially granted. They contended that this inconsistency undermines their ability to enforce rights effectively. Additionally, they challenged Rule 80, which mandates renewal fees from the second-year post-application and argued that the patent was delayed by 7 years, but the renewal fee was paid for the whole of the term, causing double jeopardy, leading to a violation of their rights under Article 22 of the Constitution. This, they claim, amounts to an unfair burden, as the patent was neither received nor commercially utilised during the delayed period. Accordingly, they argued that procedural inconsistencies hindered their patent infringement claims due to stipulations in Section 11A (7). The appellants contended that Respondents argued that the claim was barred by res judicata, citing previous dismissals by the courts, including the Division Bench, and the subsequent review rejection. They emphasized that Section 53 was upheld in prior rulings and that the appeal lacked merit. After considering the factual and legal contentions, the court dismissed the case, stating that the statue mandates an action of infringement may be brought about only if a patent has been granted though damages can be sought from the date of publication, and thus both Section 53 and Section 11A (7) operate in two different fields. The court also observed that Section 53 aligns with international obligations under TRIPS, extending patent terms while providing limited interim protection through Section 11A (7). The court also considered findings from a committee, which examined expedited examination feasibility and Patent Term Adjustment (PTA), which concluded that PTA, as implemented in the USA, was unsuitable for India, given concerns about prolonged monopoly and technological obsolescence. Ultimately, the court found no merit in interfering with the original judgment, reiterating that legislative matters should remain within the purview of policymakers. Gunjan Sinha @ Kanishk Sinha & Anr v. Union of India & Ors [MAT 903 OF 2024 with CAN/2/2024] Click here to read the judgment copy  

In a recent judgment, the Delhi High Court has significantly observed that trade marks comprising solely of numbers and number combinations can be considered inherently distinctive and do not necessarily need to acquire secondary meaning through use to be considered eligible for registration. The judgment emanates out of an appeal against a refusal order passed by the Trade Marks Registry (“Registry”) rejecting the trade mark application for the mark ‘2929’, covering cosmetics, nail polish, shampoos, etc., in Class 3. The Registry rejected the subject application stating that the mark lacked distinctive character and was merely a combination of common numbers which could not be monopolized by any individual. On the other hand, the appellant contended that when it adopted the subject mark ‘2929’ in relation to the goods covered under the application, no similar mark existed or was known in the market, which made it unique and inherently distinctive. Discussing the legal position, the Court noted that the definition of a “mark” under the Trade Marks Act expressly includes numbers, and as such, marks made up solely of numerals can be registered if they fulfil other requirements under the Act. The Court also discussed several prior decisions where other courts have, time and again, protected various numerical trademarks, such as the mark ‘501’ for soaps, ‘555’ for incense sticks, ‘91’ for bicycles, and so on. The Court also cited McCarthy on Trademarks with approval, which observes that numbers can very well function as a trademark, just like any other visual symbol.   Regarding the facts of the appeal, the Court observed that the mark ‘2929’ is a coined and arbitrary combination of numbers. The Court noted that, since the distinctiveness of a mark is determined only with reference to the goods for which it is applied for, and since ‘2929’ does not bear any direct or indirect reference to the goods covered under the subject application, it could be said to be inherently distinctive and capable of distinguishing the appellant’s goods from those of others. As a result, the court noted that, being inherently distinctive, the mark ‘2929’ is capable of registration even without having acquired any secondary significance. With these observations, the Court set aside the Registry’s refusal order and directed for the subject application to be advertised in the Trade Marks Journal, with the condition that appellant shall not claim any exclusive right over the numbers ‘2’ and ‘9’. Vineet Kapur Vs. Registrar of Trademarks [C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 22/2024] Click here to read the judgment copy

Recently, the High Court of Delhi refused to temporarily restrain the bike-taxi services’ company, Uber India, from broadcasting a video advertisement titled ‘Baddies in Bengaluru ft. Travis Head’ that allegedly infringed/disparaged Royal Challengers’ trade mark ‘ROYAL CHALLENGERS BENGALURU’ by showing the “deprecatory” variant of the mark as ‘ROYALLY CHALLENGED BENGALURU’ (and incorrectly portraying the common phrase in the Kannada language, Ee Sala Cup Namde/ This year the cup is ours) to promote Uber India’s services. RCB claimed that the impugned advertisement is “poking fun” at RCB, which is not within the permissible contours of comparative advertisement as there is no ‘fair use’ by Uber. RCB claimed that Uber aimed at encashing upon the goodwill of the RCB mark/ RCB Cricket team by showing them in derogatory light, and undermining the public’s connection with them. On the other hand, Uber claimed that the impugned advertisement employs only a humorous pun using the names of the cities Hyderabad and Bengaluru. Even if the impugned banner is taken to be a reference to the RCB Cricket team, the same is by way of intentional and denominational use in the spirit of a comical tease or parody, and constitutes light-hearted banter which is widely accepted by sporting fans and is a culturally entrenched part of the game of cricket. He further argued that the purpose and message of the advertisement is to convey that the motorbike services provided by the Uber are highly efficient and reliable. The court concurred with Uber’s submissions and opined that the general perception created by holistic viewing of the impugned advertisement is one of a healthy banter and light-hearted humour without any elements of disparagement and/or infringement with regards to the RCB trade mark/ RCB Cricket team. It opined that to determine if an advertisement is disparaging, the court will look at the intent behind the advertisement, manner of presentation, and the message trying to be conveyed, when seen through the eyes of a common layman. Thus, even an exaggeration in an advertisement is permissible as long as it does not make serious qualitative/ quantitative representations. In essence, the Uber IPL-themed advertisement did not disparage RCB. The court concluded that RCB had failed to establish that use of RCB trade mark was without due cause. Accordingly, the court while refusing the grant of interim injunction noted that the advertisement was in the context of a game of cricket – a game of sportsmanship, which, does not call for interference or restriction. Royal Challengers Sports Private Limited Vs. Uber India Systems Private Limited and Ors. [CS(COMM) 345/2025] Click here to read the judgement copy

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court recently declined to grant interim relief to Young Achievers (“Appellant”) in an appeal challenging the judgment passed by the Ld. Single Judge in IMS Learning Resources Private Limited vs. Young Achievers [CS(COMM) 602/2018] (“Impugned Judgment”). In the Impugned Judgment, the Ld. Single Judge had restrained the Appellant from using the trademarks “IMS/IMS Device” (“Impugned Marks”), holding it to be deceptively similar to the registered ‘IMS Device Mark’ of IMS Learning Resources Private Limited (“Respondent”). Additionally, the Ld. Single Judge awarded INR 30 lakh damages and costs to be paid by the Appellant. The Appellant argued that the damages awarded should not exceed the profits earned by them and contended that only nominal damages should have been awarded. In this regard, Appellant relied upon an email sent to the Respondent which stated profits earned by them. The Appellant also contended that the damages ought to be reduced since they had ceased use of the Impugned Marksupon passing of the ad interim injunction against them. The Appellant furtherasserted that the Respondent does not hold a registration for the word mark “IMS” but only for a device mark. Upon examining the Appellant’s submissions, the Court refused to stay the decree of permanent injunction granted by Ld. Single Judge. The Court held that the Appellant’s contention as to cessation of use of the Impugned Mark could only be considered only if, upon learning of the Respondent’s trademark registration, Appellant ceased the use of the Impugned Marks. However, the court after considering the Appellant’s email sent to the Respondent, adjusted the recoverable amount to INR 22.5 lakh, aligning it with actual figures admitted by the Appellant in that email. Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources Private Limited [RFA(OS)(COMM) 7/2025] Click here to read the judgement copy

In a recent order dated April 23, 2025, the Delhi High Court granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction to Wipro Enterprises Private Limited (“Wipro”) in a trademark infringement suit against Global Care Industries, restraining the later from using the mark ‘MACKLEAN’, which was found to be deceptively similar to Wipro’s registered and prior mark ‘MAXKLEEN’. Wipro, a prominent FMCG company, acquired rights in the mark MAXKLEEN through its predecessor-in-interest in 2007. The mark was originally coined in 1990 and has been extensively used in India since 2019 f or disinfectants and cleaners. Wipro submitted that it holds several valid registrations for MAXKLEEN in Classes 3 and 5 and has made significant sales and advertising investments under the mark. In March 2025, Wipro discovered that the defendants were marketing identical products under the mark MACKLEAN on e-commerce platforms, namely, Meesho and TradeRaise. It was alleged that the adoption of MACKLEAN was dishonest, intended to ride on the goodwill of MAXKLEEN, and was likely to confuse consumers. The Court found merit in Wipro’s claim, observing that the marks MAXKLEEN and MACKLEAN are phonetically and visually similar and are used for identical goods, thereby establishing a prima facie case of trade mark infringement and passing off. Accordingly, the Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of Wipro restraining the defendants from using the mark MACKLEAN or any deceptively similar variant. Further, a Local Commissioner was appointed to visit the defendants’ premises, seize infringing goods, and file an inventory report under full protection of concerned SHO and DCP. Wipro Enterprises Private Limited vs. Global Care Industries & Anr. [CS(COMM) 365/2025 with I.A. 10101/2025, I.A. 10102/2025, I.A.10103/2025, I.A. 10104/2025, I.A. 10105/2025, I.A. 10106/2025. and I.A. 10107/2025] Click here to read the judgement copy.

Recently, the Delhi High Court granted a compulsory license for the sound recordings owned by Phonographic Performance Limited (“PPL”) in response to a petition filed by Al Hamd Tradenation (“Petitioner”). The Petitioner was organizing a corporate event for 50 attendees at a hotel in Delhi. During the booking process, the hotel informed the Petitioner that a music license from PPL would be required and quoted license fees of INR 49,500. Upon receiving the quotation, the Petitioner requested that PPL reduce the fee to 1/3rd of the license fees, given the small scale of the event. In response, PPL initiated a civil suit against the Petitioner, prompting the latter to file a petition seeking a compulsory license and determination of fair license fees, alleging that PPL charges arbitrary and unreasonable tariffs. The Petitioner argued that PPL’s demand for exorbitant license fees effectively withholds access to musical works from the public. PPL, on the other hand, contended that it had not refused public performance of its works, but merely sought compliance by payment of license fees as per its publicly published tariff structure. The Court noted that the Supreme Court of India is currently considering the issue as to whether PPL could be permitted to issue or grant licenses without being registered as a copyright society (Phonographic Performance Limited v. Azure Hospitality Pvt. Ltd., SLP(C) No. 10977/2025). It clarified that any directions issued by the Supreme Court would impact the present proceedings. Importantly, the Court acknowledged that where there is a refusal to authorize public performance or republication of works, it has the authority to grant a compulsory license, subject to payment of compensation, which may be determined by the court. It also clarified that the availability of copyrighted works to certain members of the public does not preclude others from seeking compulsory licenses, particularly where the terms offered are unreasonable, which may amount to constructive refusal. The Court compared PPL’s license fees with those charged by Recorded Music Performance Limited (RMPL), currently the only registered copyright society in India for sound recordings, and found that PPL’s tariffs are not aligned with market standards. It held that, given PPL’s extensive repertoire, it is under an obligation to offer licenses on fair and reasonable terms. Accordingly, the Court directed that the Petitioner be granted a compulsory license for PPL’s sound recordings at a fair and reasonable tariff. Both parties were instructed to file affidavits of evidence to enable the Court to determine appropriate compensation, terms, and conditions of the license. Al Hamd Tradenation v. Phonographic Performance Limited, C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 8/2024, judgment dated May 13, 2025. Click here to read the judgement copy.

Recently, in an intra-court appeal filed by Under Armor Inc. (“Appellant”), a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court overturned a single judge’s decision that had declined interim relief to the Appellant. By way of quick background, the Appellant had initiated a suit against Anish Agarwal and his company (“Respondents”) alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement, seeking an interim order restraining the Respondents from using AERO ARMOUR and AERO ARMR (“impugned marks”) and other marks that are deceptively similar to the Appellant’s marks. However, the single judge disposed of the application with certain restrictions instead of granting the injunction. The Appellant contended that, while it has not applied for registration of the standalone word ‘ARMOUR’ in India, it is the proprietor of various trademark and label registrations, inter alia, comprising the word ‘ARMOUR’ worldwide. The Appellant further stated that the overall impression of the impugned marks, is deceptively similar to its registered marks, including its word mark UNDER ARMOUR. The Appellant also argued that the single judge has misapplied the initial interest confusion test on the erroneous premise that there may be ‘transient wonderment’, but an informed customer would proceed to find out the differences between the products at the time of purchase. While resisting the Appellant’s action, the Respondents contended that the Appellant does not have any rights in respect of the word ‘ARMOUR’ and if it is deleted from the respective marks, there is no similarity between them. Further, the Respondents tried defending the impugned marks by claiming that the designs are ‘inspired’ by military and Indian defence forces and therefore, their products cater to different markets and are distinct from the sporting apparel sold under the Appellant’s marks. Upon considering the submissions made by the parties, the Division Bench held that the test of initial interest confusion was incorrectly applied by the single judge and opined that if the customer looking at the impugned marks associates the same with the Appellant’s marks, even for a brief period, the Appellant’s marks would be infringed. Further, the court stated that the single judge had applied the anti-dissection rule erroneously by removing the common word ‘ARMOUR’ for the purpose of comparing the rival marks instead of evaluating them as a whole. It also rejected the superficial distinction drawn by the Respondents between casual wear and sportwear and acknowledged the identical nature of goods. Ultimately, the court found no merit in the single judge’s decision and set aside the order. Under Armour Inc vs. Anish Agarwal and Anr. [(FAO(OS) (COMM) 174/2024 & CM No.46175/2024 & 52564/2024, judgement dated May 23, 2025] Click here to read the judgement copy.

Recently, the High Court of Delhi allowed a writ petition filed by Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mittal (“Petitioner”), thereby directing the Registrar of Trade Marks (“Respondent”) to restore and reinstate the Petitioner’s trademark MILTON. The Court further directed the Respondent to grant renewal of the said trademark, subject to the Petitioner’s filing of the requisite application and compliance with the prescribed formalities. The Petitioner’s mark MILTON was entered into the Register of Trade Marks on May 30, 2003 and was due for renewal on May 6, 2004. However, due to non-renewal within the prescribed time, the registration lapsed and was consequently removed from the Register, as notified in the Trade Marks Journal dated October 16, 2010. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed an RTI application to ascertain whether the Respondent has served him with a Form O-3 Notice in terms of Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Act”). It was the Petitioner’s case that since Form O-3 Notice was not served on him, the removal of the trademark from the Register was not in accordance with the mandatory procedure of law. The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the removal of the Petitioner’s mark was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court observed that issuance of written Form O-3 Notice to the registered proprietor of a trademark in case where no renewal application has been filed is a mandate under the Act. Relying on several judicial precedents, the Court stated that it is a settled legal position that mere expiration of a trademark registration either by lapse of time and/or failure of the registered proprietor to get it renewed does not ispo facto justify its removal from the Register. The removal of the trademark without complying with the mandatory procedural requirement is ex facie illegal. Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petition. Rakesh Kumar Mittal v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [W.P.(C)-IPD 40/2024 & CM 141/2024, judgement dated April 29, 2025]

Recently, the High Court of Delhi allowed a writ petition filed by Mr. Rakesh Kumar Mittal (“Petitioner”), thereby directing the Registrar of Trade Marks (“Respondent”) to restore and reinstate the Petitioner’s trademark MILTON. The Court further directed the Respondent to grant renewal of the said trademark, subject to the Petitioner’s filing of the requisite application and compliance with the prescribed formalities. The Petitioner’s mark MILTON was entered into the Register of Trade Marks on May 30, 2003 and was due for renewal on May 6, 2004. However, due to non-renewal within the prescribed time, the registration lapsed and was consequently removed from the Register, as notified in the Trade Marks Journal dated October 16, 2010. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed an RTI application to ascertain whether the Respondent has served him with a Form O-3 Notice in terms of Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Act”). It was the Petitioner’s case that since Form O-3 Notice was not served on him, the removal of the trademark from the Register was not in accordance with the mandatory procedure of law. The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the removal of the Petitioner’s mark was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court observed that issuance of written Form O-3 Notice to the registered proprietor of a trademark in case where no renewal application has been filed is a mandate under the Act. Relying on several judicial precedents, the Court stated that it is a settled legal position that mere expiration of a trademark registration either by lapse of time and/or failure of the registered proprietor to get it renewed does not ispo facto justify its removal from the Register. The removal of the trademark without complying with the mandatory procedural requirement is ex facie illegal. Accordingly, the Court allowed the writ petition. Rakesh Kumar Mittal v. The Registrar of Trade Marks [W.P.(C)-IPD 40/2024 & CM 141/2024, judgement dated April 29, 2025]