Recently, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court granted an interim injunction in favour of Travel Blue Limited, and its Indian subsidiary Travel Blue Products India Private Limited, (“Travel Blue”), restraining the Miniso Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd. and Miniso Hong Kong Ltd (“Miniso”) from pirating Travel Blue’s registered design for its Tranquillity Neck Pillow.  Travel Blue first registered its Tranquillity Neck Pillow design in India and several other countries in 2015, and thereafter, began marketing and selling the product through online and offline modes. In 2024, Travel Blue discovered that Miniso was selling travel neck pillows with features and colors identical to its Tranquillity Neck Pillow. Miniso, in its defense, claimed that Travel Blue had concealed the existence of similar prior designs when it applied for the registration of its neck pillow. It also argued that the rival products were materially different, citing differences in contours, length, clasp placement, and style. Additionally, Miniso claimed that features like the pillow’s foldability, storage pouch, and memory foam were purely functional and could not be monopolized, and therefore, Travel Blue’s design registration should be cancelled. The court rejected Miniso’s arguments. It pointed out that while Miniso had challenged Travel Blue’s design registration as being functional, these contentions were contrary to its pleadings where Miniso had accepted the visual appeal of Travel Blue’s design The court also noted that Miniso failed to provide evidence of any similar third-party products that existed before Travel Blue’s registration. According to the court, a claim to cancel a registered design based on prior publication requires clear evidence in a brochure, book, or journal clearly illustrating the prior design. The court also observed that, prima facie, Travel Blue’s pillow had aesthetic appeal, and was not purely functional in nature. Ultimately, the court found that Miniso’s travel pillow had an obvious similarity to Travel Blue’s registered design and, as a result, granted the injunction in favour of Travel Blue. Travel Blue Products India Private Limited and Another v. Miniso Life Style Private Limited and Another., Commercial IPR Suit (L) No. 28275 of 2024 Read the judgement copy here.  

Recently, the Delhi High Court decided a case filed by Shri Ved Prakash Garg, trading as M/s. Parul Food Products, seeking rectification for cancellation/removal of the FUNSHINE word and device marks registered in the name of Mr. Dhruv Singh. The Petitioner, sole proprietor of M/s. Parul Food Products, is engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of puffs, namkeen, biscuits, rusk, chips and confectionery goods falling in Class 30. The Petitioner claims to be the original conceiver and proprietor of the trade mark, and artistic work subsisting in the FUNFINE mark, and holds various registrations/applications in Class 30. The Respondent operates in an identical business, and manufactures and sells goods, including puffs, namkeen, and confectionery items under its FUNSHINE mark, and has registrations for the word and device mark in Class 30, with a use claim of 2017. The Petitioner submitted that it has been honestly and continuously using its FUNFINE mark, and that the mark not only forms an integral part but also constitutes the dominant and distinguishing feature in its trade marks. The Petitioner also asserted ownership of copyright in the artistic works for the labels. The Petitioner further relied on the revenue, goodwill, substantial investment, high quality of products, etc. Further, the Petitioner submitted that the Respondent adopted the Impugned Mark on and in relation to identical goods to ride upon the Petitioner’s goodwill, and that the Petitioner is the prior adopter and user of its mark. The court proceed ex-parte, and noted that the Petitioner is, in fact, the earlier adopter and proprietor of the FUNFINE mark. Further, the court, upon comparing the marks, found them to be phonetically and deceptively similar, and likely to cause confusion among the public and consumers. The court also noted that although, a critical comparison might disclose some differences, however a purchaser of average intelligence would definitely be deceived by the overall similarity. Further, a holistic comparison of the rival marks highlight significant phonetic, structural, and visual similarities, which are likely to create confusion or suggest a false association between the products or their origin. Based on the analysis, the court allowed the petition, and ordered that the Respondent’s registrations are liable to be removed from the Register. The court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to issue appropriate notifications to this effect. Shri Ved Prakash Garg, trading as M/s. Parul Food Products vs. Mr. Dhruv Singh and Anr. [C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 80/2021]

Recently, the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, in an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, set aside an order passed by the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, whereby Marriott Worldwide Corporation’s (“Petitioner”) opposition against the registration of a deceptively similar trade mark THE NEW MARRION, by Sunjoy Hans (“Respondent”) was dismissed on the ground that the evidence filed by the Petitioner in support of the opposition was not apostilled in accordance with law. The Petitioner is a well-known brand engaged in the business of providing hospitality and related services. The Petitioner first adopted the trade mark MARRIOTT, in 1957 and 1992, worldwide and in India, respectively, and has been continuously using it since then. The Petitioner’s earliest registration for its trade mark MARRIOTT in India dates back to 1992. On November 8, 2022, the Respondent filed an application to register the trade mark THE NEW MARRION, on and in relation to similar services, i.e., hospitality services, claiming use since October 12, 2000. It was the Petitioner’s case that the Registrar dismissed the opposition on the ground that the affidavit in support thereof had not been apostilled in accordance with law, which, according to the Petitioner, constituted a grave violation of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended by the Petitioner that the Registrar completely disregarded the Petitioner’s affidavit despite the fact that it was notarized before the Notary Public of the place where it was executed, i.e., Maryland, the U.S.A, which was unjustifiably and arbitrarily not taken on record. The Respondent, on the other hand, contended that the appeal was infructuous as the statutory authorities were well within their rights not to place reliance on the Petitioner’s affidavit. The Court opined that, given that the affidavit was notarized before the Notary Public of the U.S.A., there was no further requirement for the government to issue a notice under Section 14 of the Notaries Act, 1952 (a notification issued by the government to recognize notarial acts performed by notaries in foreign countries). The Court observed that, in terms of Rule 120(3)(b) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, affidavits duly notarized in any country outside India before a Notary Public of that country are valid and admissible, and such special statutory provisions must prevail over general law. The Court further clarified that the Notaries Act, 1952 does not impose any embargo on accepting such evidence, and that under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there exists a presumption as to the genuineness of the seal and signature of the foreign Notary. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order of the Registrar and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, directing that the opposition be heard on merits, and the evidence filed by the Petitioner be duly taken on record.

The Delhi High Court recently modified an interim injunction granted by the Commercial Court, Saket, in a trademark dispute over the mark SALONI between M/s. Nakoda Food Marketing & Ors. (“Appellant”) and M/s. Mahesh Edible Oil Industries Ltd. (“Respondent”). The Respondent, proprietor of the trademark SALONI, had secured an interim injunction restraining the Appellant from using the mark SALONI. The Appellant appealed the order of Commercial Court asserting continuous use of mark SALONI since 1993. It is the Appellant’s case that the Respondent was aware of the Appellant’s use of the mark SALONI for for over five years and therefore, was estopped by law of acquiescence. Significantly, it was submitted that in August 2024, after the grant of the interim injunction, the Appellant obtained registration for the mark SALONI in Class 30. Therefore, it was submitted that, as per Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where two parties hold valid registrations for same marks, neither can restrain the other for infringement. The Respondent argued that it is the prior registered proprietor of the mark SALONI and that the Appellant had failed to provide any documents that establish any credible or continuous use of the mark SALONI prior to the adoption established by the Respondent. It was further argued that the Appellant’s registration was obtained only after the grant of the interim injunction and hence, cannot have a retrospective effect. The court observed that the Appellant’s subsequent registration of the mark SALONI does not amount to a ground for setting aside of the interim injunction but constituted a “change in circumstances”. Based on this, the court was of the opinion that since both the Respondent and Appellant are now registered proprietors of the mark SALONI, they are barred from suing the other for infringement. Accordingly, the Court modified the injunction by allowing the Appellant to use the mark SALONI strictly for goods covered by its registration, i.e., namkeen/cereal preparations and seeds under Class 30, while remaining restrained from using the mark for other goods. M/S NAKODA FOOD MARKETING & ORS. VERSUS M/S MAHESH EDIBLE OIL INDUSTRIES [FAO (COMM)-92/2024] Read the judgement here.

The Calcutta High Court delivered a significant judgment in ITC Limited v. Controller of Patents (IPDPTA No. 121 of 2023), overturning the Patent Office’s refusal of ITC’s patent application for a device and method to generate and deliver nicotine aerosol without electronic or heating components. Background: The Patent Office rejected ITC’s application primarily under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970, which excludes patents for inventions whose intended use could be contrary to public order or morality, or injurious to human, animal, or plant life. The refusal cited health concerns, government statutes (including the Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019), and the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) White Paper on Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems. Court’s Findings: The Court emphasized the applicant was not provided proper notice or an opportunity to respond to many critical documents and statutes first introduced in the refusal order, violating principles of natural justice. Section 3(b) should be interpreted with focus on the invention’s primary or intended use rather than speculative or indirect health consequences. Tobacco and nicotine-related inventions are not categorically excluded under Section 3(b) or patent law in India. Granting a patent does not equate to the right of commercialization, therefore, regulatory restrictions do not justify refusal of patentability. The Court referred to India’s international obligations, i.e., TRIPS and Paris Convention, to reinforce that patent rights cannot be denied solely due to domestic commercialization restrictions. Consequently, the Court set aside the refusal and remanded the case for a fresh examination by a different officer, to issue a reasoned decision within six months with fair opportunity for ITC to respond. Key Takeaways Procedural Fairness is Essential: Patent offices must disclose all documents and grounds relied upon well in advance, ensuring applicants can meaningfully contest objections. Scientific and Technical Evidence Must Support Refusals: Blanket assumptions about harm or morality without evidence cannot justify refusing a patent. Patentability vs. Commercial Regulation: Patent grant decisions should not be integrated with regulatory or policy decisions on public health or market access, which are separate government functions. Tobacco/Nicotine Inventions Aren’t Per Se Barred: Such inventions require individual assessment on inventive merit and statutory grounds, and therefore should not be automatically exclusion. This ruling marks a pivotal development balancing innovation incentive with public health concerns in India’s evolving patent landscape. ITC Limited v. Controller of Patents (IPDPTA No. 121 of 2023)

A single judge of the Delhi High Court recently returned a suit filed by Vikrant Chemico Industries Pvt. Ltd. (“Vikrant Chemico”) against Shri Gopal Engineering & Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (“Shri Gopal”) for want of territorial jurisdiction. Vikrant Chemico had filed the suit alleging trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off in relation to its registered marks DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE and DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL by Shri Gopal’s use of DOCTOR HAZEL’S BRAND PHENYL and CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL marks. Shri Gopal sought rejection of plaint contending that both the parties were based in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. Vikrant Chemico relied upon Shri Gopal’s website claiming pan-India sales and listings on IndiaMart, both accessible in Delhi, and the Local Commissioner’s report indicating sporadic sales of the infringing goods in Delhi for establishing jurisdiction. On merits, Vikrant Chemico claimed prior adoption and registration for the Doctor Brand Phenyle and Doctor Brand Germ Troll marks, which as per Vikrant Chemico had acquired distinctiveness owing to their long and continuous use. Vikrant Chemico further submitted that the term Doctor is the dominant feature in both the rival marks, and that the likelihood of confusion is exemplified by Shri Gopal’s use of a deceptively similar packaging and trade dress. Shri Gopal denied jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court by contending that no proof of actual sales in Delhi existed. It argued that its website was merely passive, and that the shopkeeper’s statement was inadmissible owing to lack of cogent proof. On merits, it contended that Vikrant Chemico’s registration for the DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE was for a device mark, and no exclusivity can be claimed on Doctor, which is a generic term and common to the trade. Further, Shri Gopal contended that although their mark Doctor Hazel’s is registered with a disclaimer on the term Doctor, the term Hazel is the dominant element. Differences in packaging and colour schemes were also highlighted to negate confusion. The Court held that Vikrant Chemico had failed to show any part of the cause of action arising in Delhi since no evidence of sales in Delhi were produced  in trial and mere accessibility of a passive website or online listing, such as IndiaMart, could not confer jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court returned the plaint for lack of jurisdiction. It further observed that the term Doctor was generic, infringement cannot be claimed against another registered proprietor, and the clear differences in rival packaging reduced likelihood of confusion. Vikrant Chemico Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Gopal Engineering & Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd. [CS (COMM) 85/2018] Judgement dt. August 20, 2025

Mere automation through Standard Data Processing cannot be allowed patent protection in India: Calcutta High Court Upholds Patent Refusal u/s 3(k) for Software-Implemented Inventions In Google LLC v. Controller of Patents (IPDPTA/90/2023), the Calcutta High Court clarified the boundaries of patent eligibility for computer-related inventions, particularly those characterized as software-driven methods. Google LLC appealed the rejection of its Indian patent application (No. 2705/KOLNP/2014), which described a method for labelling visited locations based on contact information. The invention aimed to improve location-aware services by associating location history with contextual labels (like “home,” “work”) derived from a user’s contacts, thereby providing enhanced functionality for computing devices. The court found that the rejection was based on Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, which excludes “a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms” from patentability, unless the invention demonstrates technical advancement or involves novel hardware. The Assistant Controller reasoned that all steps (collecting, determining, associating, outputting) were executed as software routines on generic hardware, and the claims lacked any concrete technical effect or improvement to computing technology itself. The Court held that the claims described, in essence, the automation of administrative and labelling functions through standard data processing without sufficient technical contribution beyond a normal computer program. Google’s reliance on precedents such as Ferid Allani, Blackberry Limited, Microsoft Technology Licensing decisions were distinguished. In the said earlier cases, the inventions showed clear technical effects or advances beyond standard software operations, which was found lacking in Google’s application. The Result The High Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the Patent Office’s reasoning and confirming that the application’s subject matter fell within the exclusions of Section 3(k). The mere automation or contextual enhancement of location history was deemed insufficient for patenting, absent a demonstrable technical advancement or inventive hardware. Why This Matters This decision reinforces that, under Indian law, computer-implemented inventions must do more than repackage abstract administrative or algorithmic ideas in method claims. Applicants must substantiate technical effect or hardware novelty to avoid the Section 3(k) bar. Making location history automatic or more contextual isn’t enough to get a patent unless there’s a clear technical improvement or new hardware involved. Google LLC v. Controller of Patents (IPDPTA/90/2023)

In a recent decision, the Delhi High Court addressed a challenge brought by Sushil Kumar, trading as Da Polo and another petitioner (“Petitioners”) against an order of the Commercial Court, which had refused to reject a trademark and copyright infringement suit filed by The Polo/Lauren Company L.P. (“Respondent”). The Respondent, proprietor of the globally renowned marks POLO, RALPH LAUREN, and formative variants, initiated a suit seeking a permanent injunction against the Petitioners’ use of the mark/label “DA POLO” for identical goods. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioners were advertising and selling products bearing the infringing marks through their website, WWW.DAPOLO.IN, and e-commerce platforms, such as Amazon and Flipkart. The Petitioners filed an application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC, contending that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, was undervalued, and that the Commercial Court lacked territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, since their principal places of business were in Sonipat, Haryana and Rohini, New Delhi. They further argued that mere accessibility of a website could not vest jurisdiction in the Delhi court. The Commercial Court rejected the application, holding that the Respondent had made sufficient pleadings of cause of action within its jurisdiction, including screenshots of infringing products available in Delhi through interactive platforms. The Petitioners’ objections on pecuniary jurisdiction had earlier been dismissed and were not pressed again. On revision, the High Court reiterated that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, interference is warranted only in cases of patent lack of jurisdiction. It noted that the plaint must be read as correct at this stage and that online interactivity and availability of products to Delhi consumers established purposeful targeting and a prima facie cause of action. The Court also agreed with the Commercial Court’s reliance on precedents holding that virtual availability of goods is akin to physical presence in the market. Accordingly, the Court upheld the Commercial Court’s order, dismissed the Petitioners’ objections of forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction, and rejected the petition as being devoid of merit. Sushil Kumar T/A Da Polo & Anr vs The Polo/ Lauren Company L.P.

Recently, the Delhi High Court dismissed an application seeking injunction restraining the defendant, Mach Conferences and Events Limited from, inter alia, infringement of the trade mark, passing off, misrepresentation, dilution, unfair competition, including as part of domain name, the marks BOOKMYYATRA.COM or BOOKMYYATRA (“Impugned Marks”). By way of background, the plaintiff, Yatra Online Limited, adopted the mark YATRA in 2005 as a part of its trade name/corporate name and commenced its business of providing online travel booking and related services to its customers in the year 2006 and is the registered proprietor of YATRA marks in Class 39. Counsel for plaintiff contended that while the plaintiff’s registrations contain a disclaimer that no exclusive rights would be granted to the word ‘Yatra’, however, YATRA being the most dominant feature of the plaintiff’ mark, is distinctive and well-known for travel booking and related services industry. Further, he reasoned that even though there is a disclaimer with regard to the plaintiff not having exclusive rights in the word YATRA, there are numerous trade marks of the plaintiff that have been granted without any disclaimer. It was submitted that the defendant adopted the plaintiff’s mark YATRA in the Impugned Marks. On the other hand, counsel for defendant submitted that the plaintiff does not have any right in the word YATRA in Class 39 in relation to travel and related services. He further pointed out that the plaintiff has accepted the disclaimer with respect to not having exclusive right for the word YATRA, and cannot detach itself from the said disclaimer and claim larger rights. He also pointed out that the plaintiff does not have any registration in Class 39 as its application stands opposed. The plaintiff also does not have any common law right in the word YATRA as the same has been used by innumerable travel operators all over India since a long period of time, as part of their business names. Counsel further asserted that the combination of ‘Book’ and ‘My’ has become common for online businesses and several businesses combine this word with other words to invent new names/marks such as ‘BookMyShow’, ‘BookMySport’, ‘BookMyTrip’ etc. While analysing the case, the court noted that the word Yatra cannot be said to have acquired a secondary meaning since the plaintiff failed to establish that the term has acquired a secondary meaning and is exclusively associated with the plaintiff. Further, the single judge observed that Yatra is synonymous with ‘travel’ in Hindi and is a generic and descriptive word in the travel industry and cannot be monopolised by a single trader. The court also reiterated the significance of disclaimers in demarcating the scope of rights, beyond which no trader can claim exclusivity. Read the judgement copy here.

In a recent trademark dispute, the Bombay High Court dismissed the plaintiff, Mangalam Organics Ltd.’s (“Plaintiff”) interim injunction application against the use of the marks “KARPURE” and “AIR KARPURE” by N Ranga Rao and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (“Defendant”), citing no actionable case of trademark infringement or passing off. Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant’s use of the marks “KARPURE” and “AIR KARPURE” infringed its registered mark CAMPURE and CAMPURE Device, which it used for camphor-based products since 2017. The Plaintiff claimed that it has built substantial goodwill and reputation in the CAMPURE marks, supported by considerable sales and advertising expenditure. In 2022, Plaintiff found that Defendant intends to launch camphor-based products under the marks “KARPURE” and “AIR KARPURE” with similar trade dress. It was further submitted that the suffix “PURE” was distinctive in connection with camphor products and had come to be exclusively associated with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also emphasized that under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, passing off actions were maintainable even against registered proprietors. The Defendant argued that, as the registered proprietor of its marks, the Plaintiff cannot claim infringement. The Defendant also claimed that rival marks were phonetically and visually dissimilar. Further, the Defendant uses the letter K as a distinctive element and has added the word AIR in its mark. It also argued that the word PURE is a common descriptive term in the trade and that no one could claim a monopoly over it. The Defendant also claimed acquiescence since the Plaintiff, despite sending a cease and desist notice in 2022, filed a case in 2025. The Court held that trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does not apply when both parties hold valid registrations. Further, the court opined that since the Plaintiff did not oppose the Defendant’s registration earlier, and both marks passed legal scrutiny, infringement was not established. The Court found no phonetic or visual similarity between the marks KARPURE and CAMPURE, emphasizing distinct packaging and no likelihood of consumer confusion. The passing off claim also failed due to a lack of specific misrepresentation and the absence of consumer confusion. The Court also emphasized the importance of full disclosure since the Plaintiff hid opposition against its CAMPURE mark by a third-party CALAPURE mark, where it argued that CALPURE and CAMPURE marks are different and dismissed the interim relief, affirming that registered trademarks can coexist. Mangalam Organics Ltd v. N Ranga Rao and Sons Pvt Ltd, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 301 Read the judgement copy here.