The present appeal has been filed by Goodview Fashion Private Limited (“Appellant”) against an order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks (“Respondent”) refusing registration of the Appellant’s application for the Pi logo on the ground on non-distinctiveness. It was the Appellant’s case that the impugned order of the Respondent is arbitrary and perverse as it is based on an unsubstantiated assumption that the mark Pi logo is a common surname/personal name. The Appellant submitted that any finding on ‘non-distinctiveness’ needs to be preceded by specific reference to other uses of the same mark by third parties. The Appellant further submitted that the Pi logo is a mere variation of its existing registered mark Tarun Tahiliani logo and adopted by the Appellant in an honest and bona fide manner. The court was of the view that a finding on non-distinctiveness shall fall into either of the two (2) categories, i.e., (i) the mark inherently is incapable of being used to distinguish the goods/services in relation to which it is used, and (ii) the mark is commonly used in relation to such goods/services and is incapable of acting as a source identifier. The court noted that, in the Respondent’s order, there is no reference to any such other mark which is similar to the Appellant’s Pi logo. Further, the Pi logo is clearly distinctive as it is a creative depiction of the mathematical symbol ‘Pi’ and also represents the Appellant’s brand/label ‘Tarun Tahiliani’. In light of the same, the court held that the Respondent’s observation in the impugned order, that the Pi logo is devoid of any distinctive character, is misplaced. Accordingly, the court set aside the Respondent’s order and directed that the Appellant’s application for the Pi logo shall proceed to advertisement. Read the judgement copy here
Ashiana Ispat Limited vs Kamdhenu Limited & Ors
Recently, in an appeal from a batch of writ petitions challenging the wrongful acceptance of trade mark applications by the Trade Marks Registry (“Registry”), a Division Bench (“DB”) of the Delhi High Court discussed the difference between the maintainability and entertainability of writ petitions. Though ruling in favour of maintainability, the DB allowed the appeal and held that it was incumbent upon the Single Judge to grant an opportunity to the applicant of the impugned applications to file a reply/counter affidavit to the writ petitions. The petitions were filed by Kamdhenu Ltd. (“Kamdhenu”), challenging the acceptance of Ashiana Ispat Ltd.’s (“Ashiana”) trademark applications for the mark AL KAMDHENU GOLD. Kamdhenu contended that it owned several prior trade mark registrations for marks similar to Ashiana’s proposed mark AL KAMDHENU GOLD, and that these prior registrations had wrongly not been cited in the Examination Reports (“ER”) issued by the Registry in respect of Ashiana’s applications. The Single Judge allowed Kamdhenu’s writs without issuing a formal notice to Ashiana and remanded the impugned applications back to the Registry for de novo consideration. The Single Judge found the Registry’s manner of examining trade mark applications to be questionable. Interestingly, the Single Judge also observed that the peculiar facts of the matter warranted suo motu exercise of the court’s inherent extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and deemed the impugned applications to have been wrongly accepted. Ashiana challenged this order before the Division Bench in appeal. The Division Bench brushed aside Ashiana’s objections to the maintainability of the writ petitions. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Godrej Sara Lee (AIR 2023 SC 781), the Court observed that mere non-availment of an alternate remedy, i.e., of filing an opposition against the advertised applications, could not bar Kamdhenu from challenging the Registry’s failure to cite its prior registrations in objection to Ashiana’s subsequent applications for deceptively similar marks under Article 226. That said, the DB allowed the appeal on the ground that Ashiana ought to have been given an opportunity to place its stand before the court by way of a reply/counter affidavit. The court also questioned the purported exercise of suo motu jurisdiction by the Single Judge and observed that since the order was passed while deciding writ petitions filed by Kamdhenu, the Single Judge cannot be said to have acted suo motu. The court also noted that the Single Judge could not have allowed the writs in the absence of any finding that Ashiana’s impugned marks were similar to Kamdhenu’s earlier marks. Concludingly, the DB set aside the order allowing the writ petitions and remanded the matter back to the Single Judge for fresh consideration. The DB also kept the issue of whether it was a fit case for the Single Judge to entertain the writ petition under Article 226, open. Click here to read the judgement copy.
Wow Momo Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Wow Burger & Anr.
The Delhi High Court recently rejected an interim injunction sought by Wow Momo Foods Pvt. Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) against the use of the marks ‘WOW’ and ‘WOW! BURGER’ by the Defendants. The Court held that ‘WOW!’ is a common, laudatory expression in the food and hospitality industry as it is used to express delight over the quality of food, and no single entity can claim exclusive rights over it. The Plaintiff argued that it had coined and used the ‘WOW!’ and ‘WOW! MOMO’ marks in 2008, and had been using it continuously since then, along with other WOW! formative marks. It claimed that its use of WOW! marks was arbitrary in the food/restaurant industry, giving it the right to prevent the Defendants from similar marks. The Plaintiff also stated that the disclaimers imposed by the Trade Marks Registry on some of its registrations did not prevent enforcement of its rights especially against competitors in the same industry. The court rejected these arguments, and noted that the Plaintiff only had registrations for composite marks, rather than the standalone WOW! mark. Thereafter, the Plaintiff could not claim exclusive rights over a single element of its registered marks. The court further ruled that ‘WOW!’ is a common expression and an adjective describing product quality, and the Plaintiff could not assert exclusive rights over it. The court also held that even if such words are registered, other parties are allowed to use them honestly and descriptively. The court also found that the disclaimers imposed by the Registry on some of the Plaintiff’s ‘WOW!’ formative marks were appropriate. It also referenced the Plaintiff’s earlier statements to the Registry, where it had admitted that WOW! is an ordinary English word that becomes distinctive only when combined with another mark. The court also held that the term ‘WOW!’ had not acquired a secondary meaning exclusively associated with the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff had only been using it since 2008, which was not considered a long enough period. The court also noted that other businesses in different sectors were also using ‘WOW!’ in their trademarks. Consequently, the court refused to grant an interim injunction to the Plaintiff. It is pertinent to note that the decision of the Single Judge has been challenged in appeal before the Division Bench, which is currently pending. Wow Momo Foods Private Limited v. Wow Burger & Anr., CS (COMM) 1161/2024, judgment dated September 12, 2025 Read the judgement copy here.
Exotic Mile Vs. Imagine Marketing Pvt Ltd.
Recently, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while dismissing an appeal, upheld an order passed by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court to restrain Exotic Mile (“Appellant”) from manufacturing and marketing audio gadgets under its registered trade mark BOULT and its formative variants, owing to its deceptive similarity to the BOAT-formative marks registered in favour of Imagine Marketing Private Limited. (“Respondent”). At the outset, the Respondent had initiated a civil suit against the Appellant in the Delhi High Court, pursuant to which, the Court granted an ad interim injunction, and passed an order restraining the Appellant from using BOULT-formative marks. The Respondent was able to establish that the prevalence of goods under the BOULT-formative marks were causing actual instances of confusion among consumers, who on account of the phonetic similarities between the rival marks, were led to believe that the Appellant’s goods were associated with the Respondent. The Court, subsequently, passed an order restricting not only use of the BOULT-formative marks, but also use of a tagline “UNPLUG YOURSELF” and the name “BOULT BASS BUD” for one of the products. Aggrieved by the order, the Appellant preferred the present appeal. The Court, however, set aside the injunction against the tagline stating that the Respondent had not requested this relief. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the injunction against the BOULT and BOULT AUDIO marks, considering that the Respondent had prior use and goodwill, and that the rival marks were phonetically similar. While the Appellant argued that phonetic similarities will have minimal effect on the consumer choices given that most sales for both the parties are through online channels, the Court held that the possibility of likelihood of confusion will still be prevalent if the consumer is unable to recollect the exact name of the product which they want to purchase online. The aspect of phonetic similarity may be of somewhat lesser significance when the products are sold online but it cannot be said to be altogether irrelevant. Further, while the rival products are largely sold online, neither party denied that their products are sold in brick-and-mortar stores as well. Exotic Mile Vs. Imagine Marketing Pvt Ltd. [FAO(OS) (COMM) 20/2020], pronounced on September 15, 2025 Read the judgement copy here.
Nokia vs Asus, Acer & Hisense
Background A confidentiality club was first formed in India by the Delhi High Court in August, 2012, in a matter involving breach of confidentiality, and illegal use of trade secrets [MVF 3 APS & Ors. vs. M. Sivasamy and Ors]. Inspired by similar practices in UK courts, confidentiality clubs have been constituted in India aimed at protecting sensitive information, typically in IP disputes. The purpose of the confidentiality club is to offer a neutral and controlled way of providing sensitive information (such as trade secrets, licensing agreements, or technical data) to allow for fair litigation. Later added as part of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, it has now become a routine way to deal with sensitive documents in patent litigations. Clarity provided by DHC In an order dated 22nd September 2025, in the ongoing patent dispute between Nokia and companies Asus, Acer, and Hisense, the DHC underscored the key points on how confidential information is to be handled in cases involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). This ruling encourages greater transparency and fairness in India’s SEP litigation by addressing informational imbalances that disadvantage defendants during negotiation of FRAND terms. Mandatory, inclusive access to confidentiality clubs and full FRAND agreement disclosures, enable robust defence and potentially cut dispute time, costs and presents a better opportunity for defendants. Nokia vs Asus, Acer & Hisense [CS(COMM) 643/2025 & I.A. 15135/2025 + CS(COMM) 644/2025 & I.A. 15143/2025 + CS(COMM) 645/2025, I.A. 15150/2025 & I.A. 21050/2025] Read the judgement here.
The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors.
In an appeal against a Single Judge’s order denying an interim injunction, the Division Bench granted partial relief to Princeton University (“Appellant”) in its suit against The Vagdevi Educational Society and others (“Respondents”) from use of the PRINCETON mark in relation to any new institution during the pendency of the suit. The Single Judge had dismissed the Appellant’s motion for an interim injunction on the ground that the Appellant had failed to establish prior use in India and a prima facie case. The Appellant had claimed adoption of the PRINCETON mark in 1896, and use in India since 1911, based on several newspaper articles circulated in India. The Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, asserted that it adopted the PRINCETON mark as an ode to the Prince of Hyderabad for educating and grooming thousands (denoted by the word ‘ton’) and claimed continuous use of the said mark since 1991. The Single Judge had held that to show use of a mark, such use has to be shown by the proprietor itself and not by a third-party, thereby rejecting the newspaper articles as evidence of prior use relied upon by the Appellant, and holding the Respondents as the prior user of the PRINCETON mark in India. The Division Bench, on the contrary, held that the use of a mark need not be shown by the proprietor alone, and third-party references, such as newspaper articles in the present case, would suffice if they relate to the availability or performance of services under the Indian trade mark. Based on the aforesaid interpretation, the Division Bench held that the Appellant has established prior use in India going as far back as 1911 through Indian student engagement and media presence, placing it on par with a domestic trader. However, due to the Respondents’ long-standing use since 1991, the Appellant’s lack of physical presence in India, and the Respondents’ limited regional footprint, the Court denied a full injunction but restrained use of the PRINCETON mark for any new institutions during the suit’s pendency to balance equities. The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 Read the judgement copy here.
The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors.
In an appeal against a Single Judge’s order denying an interim injunction, the Division Bench granted partial relief to Princeton University (“Appellant”) in its suit against The Vagdevi Educational Society and others (“Respondents”) from use of the PRINCETON mark in relation to any new institution during the pendency of the suit. The Single Judge had dismissed the Appellant’s motion for an interim injunction on the ground that the Appellant had failed to establish prior use in India and a prima facie case. The Appellant had claimed adoption of the PRINCETON mark in 1896, and use in India since 1911, based on several newspaper articles circulated in India. The Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, asserted that it adopted the PRINCETON mark as an ode to the Prince of Hyderabad for educating and grooming thousands (denoted by the word ‘ton’) and claimed continuous use of the said mark since 1991. The Single Judge had held that to show use of a mark, such use has to be shown by the proprietor itself and not by a third-party, thereby rejecting the newspaper articles as evidence of prior use relied upon by the Appellant, and holding the Respondents as the prior user of the PRINCETON mark in India. The Division Bench, on the contrary, held that the use of a mark need not be shown by the proprietor alone, and third-party references, such as newspaper articles in the present case, would suffice if they relate to the availability or performance of services under the Indian trade mark. Based on the aforesaid interpretation, the Division Bench held that the Appellant has established prior use in India going as far back as 1911 through Indian student engagement and media presence, placing it on par with a domestic trader. However, due to the Respondents’ long-standing use since 1991, the Appellant’s lack of physical presence in India, and the Respondents’ limited regional footprint, the Court denied a full injunction but restrained use of the PRINCETON mark for any new institutions during the suit’s pendency to balance equities. The Trustees of Princeton University v. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors., FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 Read the judgement copy here.
Honasa Consumer Limited v. Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr.
In a recent decision, the Delhi High Court considered an application by Honasa Consumer Limited (“Plaintiff”), proprietor of The Derma Co., seeking an interim injunction against Cloud Wellness Private Limited and its Director (“Defendants”), who market skincare products under DERMATOUCH mark with similar trade dress. The Plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and passing off, asserting that the Defendants had copied its distinctive two-tone packaging and overall trade dress used since 2020 for THE DERMA CO. branded products. It claimed that the Defendants’ use of similar orange-white, blue-white, and purple-white packaging was a slavish imitation intended to exploit the Plaintiff’s goodwill. The Defendants contended that the Plaintiff’s trade dress lacked originality, being derived from earlier brands’ designs such as Hylamide (2015), and that dual-tone packaging is common across the skincare industry. They argued that their adoption was bona fide, their products prominently bore the DERMATOUCH mark, and both parties had coexisted for over four (4) years without evidence of confusion. The court observed that consumers of dermatological products are ingredient-conscious and make purchasing decisions based on formulation and efficacy rather than packaging. It held that the marks, THE DERMA CO. and DERMATOUCH, were visually and phonetically distinct, and clearly displayed on the trade dresses, enabling consumers to distinguish between the respective products. The court further observed that the Plaintiff had failed to establish distinctiveness or secondary meaning in the claimed trade dress. Relying on Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Anchor Health and Beauty Care (P) Ltd., Kellogg Company v. Pravin Kumar Bhadabhai, and Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd., the court reiterated that colour schemes alone cannot be monopolised without clear evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Accordingly, finding no prima facie case or likelihood of confusion, the court refused to grant interim injunction and dismissed the application, permitting the Defendants to continue business pending trial. Honasa Consumer Limited v. Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr. [CS(COMM) 483/2025] Read the judgement copy here.
CROCS INC v. THE REGISTRAR OF TRADEMARKSNEW DELHI & ANR.
Recently, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court directed the Trade Marks Registry (“Registry”) to remove a trade mark registration for the mark CROOSE (Stylized), owned by JNG Footstep Private Limited (“Respondent”), based on a cancellation petition filed by Crocs Inc. (“Petitioner”), based on its rights in the mark CROCS. It is the Petitioner’s case that its goods under the mark CROCS are sold worldwide, including India, since the last several years, for which it has obtained trade mark registrations. It was claimed that the lettering style used in the CROOSE (Stylized) mark is identical to that of the mark CROCS. It was further submitted that even the placement of the CROOSE (Stylized) mark on the Respondent’s products is identical to that of the mark CROCS on the Petitioner’s products. The Respondent submitted that the CROOSE (Stylized) mark is not deceptively similar to the mark CROCS as it is structurally, phonetically and visually different from the same. It was further submitted that due process was followed to obtain a registration for the CROOSE (Stylized) mark. At the outset, the court was of the view that the Petitioner being the owner of the CROCS mark is a person aggrieved and can maintain the cancellation. Further, the court, after considering the use of the CROOSE (Stylized) mark by the Respondent on its products, stated that the placement of the mark on the Respondent’s products is identical to that of the mark CROCS on the Petitioner’s products. Additionally, the overall visual and phonetic appearance of the CROOSE mark is similar to that of the mark CROCS. In light of this, the court allowed the cancellation and directed the Registry to remove the Respondent’s registration from the Trade Marks Register. Read the judgement copy here.
M/s Gopika Industries Vs Dayal Industries Pvt. Ltd.
Recently, the Delhi High Court dismissed the application filed by Dayal Industries Private Limited (“Defendant”), seeking permission to file a rectification petition against M/s Gopika Industries’ (“Plaintiff”) registered mark DYAL. The Plaintiff filed a suit, inter alia, alleging that its mark DYAL in Class 31 (dated April 4, 1996) has been infringed by the Defendant. In its written statement, the Defendant laid down four grounds: (a) it is the prior user of DAYAL, used for cattle feed since 2000, vis-à-vis the Plaintiff whose earliest invoice is of 2001; (b) prior user rights through its flagship company, which began use of DAYAL in an allied and cognate class in 1979; (c) Defendant’s mark DAYAL is similar to DYAL; and (d) Plaintiff is attempting to ride on Defendant’s goodwill. The Defendant and its flagship company have also filed a commercial suit against the Plaintiff for infringement and passing off DAYAL. Counsel for Defendant contended that it has used DAYAL since December 5, 2000, as evidenced by a purchase order, whereas the Plaintiff’s earliest invoice dates from 2001. Though the Plaintiff’s registration is dated April 4, 1996, there is no demonstrable use till 2001. He argued that prior registration without contemporaneous use would disentitle the Plaintiff from invoking Section 34. Counsel for Plaintiff relied on Section 34 and Worknest Business Centre LLP vs. Worknests, and alleged that the Plaintiff’s correspondence with statutory departments in 1996, 1998, and 1999 shows use of DYAL. The Hon’ble High Court, relying on Worknest Business, settled that the relevant date for establishing prior use by the Defendant would be the Plaintiff’s registration date, i.e., April 4, 1996, and not the first commercial invoice, i.e., June 1, 2001. It observed that documents of the registered proprietor showing steps to commence commercial use are evidence of commercial intent. The Defendant’s claim of prior rights since 1979 was dismissed since its application claimed use since May 6, 2000, and it was not carrying out any sales under DAYAL for cattle feed. While dismissing the application, the court held that the plea of invalidity raised by the Defendant is not tenable and does not give rise to a triable issue. It clarified that these observations shall not impact the merits of pending proceedings and listed the matter on December 12, 2025. Read the Judgement copy here.