The Supreme Court, in an appeal filed by Novenco Building and Industry A/S (“Novenco”) against the judgements passed by the Division Bench and Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in favour of Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (“Xero Energy”), held that in cases involving continuous infringement of intellectual property rights, the mandatory requirement of pre-litigation mediation can be waived when urgent relief is necessary to prevent public deception. The dispute arose from a civil suit filed by Novenco before the HP High Court seeking permanent injunction to restrain Xero Energy from infringing its patent and design for its industrial fans. Along with the suit, Novenco also filed an application seeking exemption from the mandatory requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Act”). The Single Judge of the High Court rejected the plaint by holding that Novenco had delayed approaching the court, and therefore it could not justify the requirement of an urgent interim relief to circumvent the mandatory requirement under Section 12A of the Act. The Division Bench upheld this decision, observing that mere continuous infringement of IP rights alone did not constitute sufficient urgency to dispense with pre-litigation mediation. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Division Bench. It held that mere delay in initiating proceedings does not legitimize an act of infringement, and cannot deprive the intellectual proprietor from seeking injunctive relief against an infringer. The court further opined that in intellectual property infringement cases, urgency is inherent due to the ongoing injury and the potential deception of the public, and therefore, infringement cannot be allowed to persist. The Court further emphasized that insisting on pre-institution mediation in cases of continuing infringement would effectively leave a plaintiff remediless, as it would allow the infringer to continue benefiting from unlawful conduct under the guise of procedural compliance, an outcome which is contrary to the very object of the provision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the civil suit and directed the suit to be proceeded on merits. [Novenco Building and Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr (SLP No. 2753/2025)] Read the judgement copy here.
Ardo Medical AG vs. M/s. SDB International and Anr.
The Delhi High Court recently decided a rectification petition filed by Ardo Medical AG, seeking cancellation of the trade mark ARDO Device, subject of Registration No. 4578111, in Class 44, in the name of M/s. SDB International. The petitioner, Ardo Medical AG, a Swiss company, engaged in development, production, and distribution of products for premature babies and newborns, has been operating under its mark for over 25 years. It uses and owns registrations for its mark in multiple jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and United States since 2008, and owns and operates several country-specific domain names, along with significant global and Indian sales. The respondent, SDB International, had purchased goods from the petitioner and its distributors in India, though no formal distributorship agreement existed between the parties. Certain goods remained undelivered despite prepayment by the respondent, for which the petitioner was willing to offer a refund. In January 2025, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had registered a mark identical to the petitioner’s ARDO mark, and falsely misrepresented proprietorship over it, obtaining registration in July 2020. Believing this to be a typographical error, the petitioner approached the respondent for clarification. The petitioner was informed that its unsold stock supplied earlier was lying with the respondent, and the respondent demanded INR 20 Lakhs to assign the registration of the impugned mark to the petitioner. This conduct revealed an intent to profit unlawfully from the petitioner’s goodwill and demonstrated bad faith and constituted trade mark squatting. The respondent was unrepresented, and the court proceeded ex-parte. The court held that the petitioner was the prior user of the ARDO mark, while noting the trite law that a prior user’s rights overrides the rights of a subsequent user even though the latter’s mark may be a registered trade mark. The court observed that the respondent’s demand for an exorbitant amount of money and misrepresentation of ownership portrays bad faith and intention to extort. Further, the court observed that the respondent’s conduct reflected a deliberate act of trade mark squatting and its manipulative tactic undermines the sanctity of the Trade Marks Register. Based on the facts and analysis, the court allowed the petition and directed the Trade Marks Registry to cancel the respondent’s registration. The impugned registration stands removed from the Trade Marks Register as on date. Ardo Medical AG vs. M/s. SDB International and Anr. [C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 92/2025] Read the judgement copy here.
Suparshva Swabs India vs AGN International & Ors
Recently, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, dismissed a plea filed by Suparshva Swabs India (“Appellant”), the manufacturer of cotton buds and hygiene products, seeking, inter alia, a decree of permanent injunction restraining AGN International & Ors. (“Respondents”) from using the mark TULIP or AGN TULIP in relation to perfumes, cosmetics, and allied goods, on the grounds of trademark infringement and passing off. One of the key grounds for rejection was that the Appellant failed to establish sufficient goodwill and reputation in respect of allied and cognate goods. The Appellant contended that it has been using the mark TULIPS on and in relation to cotton pads, wet wipes, bathroom fragrances and related goods falling under the category of cosmetics and toiletries since the year 1999. The Appellant relied on its registration for the mark TULIPS in various classes, including, in Class 3, dated November 10, 2010, obtained with a user claim of February 10, 2004. Further, the Appellant asserted that its mark TULIPS has attained the status of a well-known mark. It was the Appellant’s case that the Respondents had adopted a deceptively similar mark in relation to allied and cognate goods to exploit the Appellant’s goodwill and reputation associated with the mark TULIPS. The Respondents, on the other hand, are registered proprietor and user of the mark AGN TULIP on and in relation to perfumery and personal care products. The Respondents’ registration in Class 3 is dated February 15, 2010, and was obtained on a proposed to be used basis. While determining the issue of passing off, the court observed that the fact that rival goods travel through overlapping or same trade channels such as pharmacies or supermarkets does not, by itself, establish that the reputation of the Appellant’s mark TULIPS has travelled into the field of perfumery. Just because the rival goods are displayed within the same outlet or even on the same shelf does not automatically extend goodwill across distinct product categories. The court observed that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that its mark TULIPS has acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ in relation to cosmetics or fragrances prior to 2010 nor can the mark be regarded as a “well-known mark”. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. Suparshva Swabs India vs AGN International & Ors [FAO (COMM) 253/2023] Read the judgement copy here.
M/S NOVALIFE CONSULTANCY PVT LTD VERSUS MR. BHARAT SACHDEVA TRADING AS M/S NOVVALIFE KARNAL & ORS.
In a recent order, the Delhi High Court granted ex parte interim relief in a trademark dispute filed by Novalife Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) against Mr. Bharat Sachdeva and his associated concerns Novvalife Karnal and Novvalife Sri Ganganagar (“Defendants”), concerning the use of the mark NOVVALIFE, which is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s registered mark NOVALIFE. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff contended that the Plaintiff, engaged in migration advisory services for foreign countries, is the sole proprietor of the NOVALIFE mark and related logos, with continuous use dating back to 2016 by its predecessor, Mr. Monal Sachdeva. The Plaintiff expanded its business in 2018 to include migration consultancy services and formally incorporated Novalife Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. in 2022. The Plaintiff also secured domain names and trademark registrations for the mark, which have been recognized in the market as indicative of its services. The dispute arose when the Defendants began offering identical services under the mark NOVVALIFE and using associated domain names and trade names. The Defendants’ use of the mark, including on social media handles and websites, was found to be a slavish imitation of the Plaintiff’s platforms, replicating visual elements, structure, design, and textual content, thereby creating confusion among consumers. The Defendants were aware of the Plaintiff’s rights and goodwill, particularly given the one of the Defendant’s prior partnership with the Plaintiff’s predecessor and the explicit undertaking in the Partnership Dissolution Deed, which barred the Defendants from using the NOVALIFE mark or any similar marks. The Court observed that the Defendants’ mark was visually, phonetically, and conceptually identical to the Plaintiff’s mark, with the only difference being the additional letter “V,” which did not alter the overall commercial impression. The services offered were identical, and the trade channels and consumer base overlapped, creating a case of triple identity. The Plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case of infringement and passing off, and it was established that failure to grant interim relief would cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining the Defendants, their partners, agents, employees, and affiliates from using, offering, marketing, or advertising the mark NOVVALIFE or any similar mark, including trade names, domain names, social media handles, or logos, in relation to identical or allied services. Notices were issued to the Defendants through all permissible modes. Read the judgement copy here.
Dabur India Limited v. Patanjali Ayurved Limited & Anr.
The Delhi High Court has, in a recent case, restrained Patanjali Ayurved Limited (“Patanjali”) from broadcasting a disparaging advertisement in a suit filed by Dabur India Limited (“Dabur”). Recently, Dabur came across an advertisement by Patanjali where it portrayed all Chyawanprash products as “dhoka” (deception) and implied that only Patanjali’s own Patanjali Special Chyawanprash represented the “true power of ayurveda”. Dabur submitted that the advertisement labelling all other Chyawanprash brands as fake and deceitful damages the reputation of Dabur’s Chyawanprash product and instils a negative impression in the minds of consumers about the all other Chyawanprash products. On the other hand, Patanjali challenged Dabur’s locus by asserting that they have not specifically targeted Dabur’s product and that owning a majority market share alone does not make Dabur an aggrieved party to file the present suit. Patanjali also maintained that its advertisement merely constitutes as puffery, which is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, and only highlights the superior qualities of its product without naming any competitor. The court observed that, while comparative advertising is permissible, they cannot denigrate the quality and character of competing products even as a class. It was held that an advertiser can highlight that a particular aspect or quality of its product is superior to that of a rival, provided that the overall message of the advertisement is not misleading. The court further opined that, in the present advertisement, while Dabur’s product was not directly referred, generic disparagement of all the competing products by Patanjali is likely to cause harm to Dabur. Therefore, calling all Chyawanprash as “dhoka” crossed the line between permissible puffery and unlawful disparagement. The court reiterated that comparative advertising ceases to be protected speech when it becomes false, misleading or denigratory. Recognising Dabur’s prima facie case, the court granted an interim injunction directing Patanjali to take down the impugned advertisement and restrained it from referring to Chyawanprash as “dhoka” or suggesting that other brands lack medicinal value. Dabur India Limited v. Patanjali Ayurved Limited & Anr. [CS(COMM) 1182/2025] Decided on 06 November 2025 Read the judgement copy here.
IFRA SHEIKH VS. MOBILE BIDI TRADERS
The Bombay High Court recently upheld an interim injunction granted by the District Court, Nagpur restraining Ifra Sheikh (“Appellant”) from using Mobile Bidi Traders’ (“Respondent”) registered trademark ONLINE BIDI. Before the District Court, the Respondent asserted that it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of bidis since 2005 and holds a valid trademark registration for the ONLINE BIDI mark since 2017, along with copyright registration for its label. As per the Respondent, the Appellant, who sells bidis under the mark ATM BIDI NO. 7, adopted a deceptively similar colour scheme for its packets and bundles, which is likely to cause confusion, especially among less literate consumers who rely on visual identification rather than brand names. The Appellant denied similarity between the rival products, arguing that the trade names were distinct and that the design had already been modified since a dispute was raised by the Respondent earlier. Further, the Appellant also claimed that the Respondent’s packaging failed to comply with mandatory warning requirements under the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Packaging and Labelling Rules) Rules, 2008. The District Court, despite the objections raised by Appellant, found a prima facie case of deceptive similarity in favour of the Respondent, emphasizing on consumer confusion, and accordingly granted an interim injunction. The Appellant challenged District Court’s order by way of an appeal before the High Court. The Court affirmed the District Court’s findings that the rival products shared similarities, sufficient to cause deception. It further held that alleged non-compliance with statutory packaging requirements did not disqualify the Respondent from seeking injunction in its favour. While dismissing the appeal, the High Court noted that the orders passed by courts restraining acts of infringement and passing off, benefits not only to the owner of the trademark but also the end consumer. Read the judgement copy here.
B.C. Hasaram & Sons v. Smt. Nirmala Agarwal
In a recent judgment, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (“Court”) has served an important and timely reminder that damages must necessarily be based on evidence which proves that the claimant suffered actual loss, and that any calculation based on speculative assumptions would be liable to be set aside. The judgment came in an appeal by the Defendant/Appellant challenging a Trial Court decision where the Defendant’s mark “Amrit Nayan Jyoti” was found to be deceptively similar to the Respondent/Plaintiff’s registered trade mark “Nayan Jyoti”. Pursuant to an ex parte ad interim injunction, a Local Commissioner (“LC”) was also appointed by the Trial Court in the matter, who then visited the Defendant’s premises and recovered large quantities of packaging material and finished/unfinished infringing goods bearing the infringing marks. The suit, eventually, got decreed vide judgment dated January 13, 2025, in light of the Appellant consenting to suffer a decree. Pertinently, the Trial Court found the appellant to be a ‘habitual infringer’ and found its conduct fit to be burdened with significant damages amounting to Rs. 48,35,610/-. The Trial Court calculated the damages by multiplying the quantities of products, labels, etc., seized by the LC, with the MRP of the infringing products printed on the labels, and took the resulting figure to be the Appellant’s sales for one month. It then doubled this figure for arriving at the final awarded amount on the basis of its finding that the Defendant had been selling the products at least for 2 months. The Defendant assailed the judgment in appeal before the Division Bench. While the Court dismissed the Defendant’s challenge on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court, it found merit in the Defendant’s challenge to the award of damages and found the methodology employed by the Trial Court in ascertaining the quantum of damages to be woefully erroneous. The Court ruled that the burden of supporting the claim of damages with evidence of actual loss lied solely with the Plaintiff, and that no hypothetical or arbitrary estimations could be drawn by the Trial Court to fill the gaps in the plaintiff’s evidence. It observed that the Trial Court’s reliance on, and drawing assumptions on the basis of, unsubstantiated observations in the LC report, could not be said to constitute a rational basis for determining the quantum of damages. It further held that since the impugned judgment risked unjust enrichment of the Plaintiff as it lacked a reasoned evidentiary basis, it was liable to be set aside. Thus, the Court partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court for fresh determination limited to the issue of damages. The Court also granted both parties an opportunity to lead evidence in this regard. B.C. Hasaram & Sons v. Smt. Nirmala Agarwal, 2025:DHC:9867-DB Read the judgement copy here.
Delhi HC Backs Substance Over Form: Employment Contracts Can Establish “Proof of Right” in Patent Filings
In C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 10/2025, the Delhi High Court set aside the refusal of Indian Patent Application No. 202117029591 filed by Nippon Steel Corporation for an invention titled “High-Strength Steel Sheet and Manufacturing Method of High-Strength Steel Sheet”. The Controller had rejected the application on the ground that “proof of right” was not established for one deceased inventor, invoking Sections 6(1)(b), 6(1)(c) and 7(2) of the Patents Act to question Nippon Steel’s entitlement to apply despite the company’s internal IP regulations and employment agreement being on record. What this judgement clarifies on Patent ownership and filings In its judgment dated 24 December 2025, the Court clarified how “proof of right” under Sections 6 and 7 of the Patents Act should be viewed when employee-inventors and internal IP frameworks are involved. · Employer–employee IP frameworks can be valid proof of right: The Court held that Nippon Steel’s Basic Regulations on Intellectual Property and the written employment agreement together were sufficient to demonstrate that IP created in the course of employment vested in the company, satisfying the “proof of right” requirement under Section 7(2). The Court rejected the Patent Office’s view that only a separate assignment or a specific clause naming the invention could establish ownership in such circumstances. · Section 6(1)(b), not 6(1)(c), governs in such cases: Since the employee–inventor’s rights already stood assigned to the employer under the internal IP regime, the company qualified as an “assignee of the true inventor” under Section 6(1)(b). The Court held that the provision on legal representatives of a deceased inventor under Section 6(1)(c) was inapplicable, even though one inventor had passed away before filing, because the rights had already vested in the employer. · Procedural requirements cannot defeat substantive IP rights: Emphasising that procedure is the handmaid of justice, the Court found that insisting on additional formalities despite clear contractual vesting of IP would unduly elevate form over substance. It also noted that six other patent applications with the same four inventors and the same proof-of-right documents had already been granted by the Patent Office, and a contrary approach here was unjustified. Why this judgement matters This decision is a significant boost for R&D-driven businesses operating in India that rely on global IP policies and standard employment contracts to capture employee inventions. It confirms that well-documented employer–employee IP arrangements, read with corporate IP regulations, can validly support patent filings even when fresh inventor signatures or separate assignments are not feasible, so long as those documents clearly show how rights in employee inventions vest in the company. NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION V. THE CONTROLLER OF PATENTS C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 10/2025 Read the judgement copy here.
Semaglutide’s Second Patent Falls Flat: Delhi HC Draws a Hard Line on Evergreening
Semaglutide is the rare drug that sits at the intersection of science, culture and capital. The Delhi High Court’s semaglutide order in CS(COMM) 565/2025 Novo Nordisk v Dr Reddy’s shows how Indian courts will police the outer edge of that capital: the extra years companies try to add through follow‑on patents. Novo’s enforcement hinged on a later “species” patent, IN262697, claiming semaglutide as a specific GLP‑1 analogue. An older “genus” patent, IN275964, had already claimed a broad family of long‑acting GLP‑1 derivatives and run its full 20‑year term. At the interim stage, the Court refused an injunction, not because there was no infringement, but because it saw a strong prima facie case that IN’697 was vulnerable on validity. Three planks mattered; First, on a technical read, the Court held that a skilled person could move from the genus disclosure (including Example 61) to semaglutide using a known substitution at position 8 (Ala to Aib), within a problem–solution framework already set by the genus patent: extend half‑life and dosing interval of GLP‑1 analogues. That pushed the case towards obviousness and prior claiming. Second, the Court treated Novo’s own behaviour as data. Form 27 filings clubbed both patents for the same commercial products (Rybelsus / Wegovy). Foreign patent term extensions and SPCs for semaglutide repeatedly relied on the genus family. Together, these were read as admissions that semaglutide was already inside the genus patent’s scope, making the later patent look like a time shifted repackaging of the same inventive concept. Third, the Court framed this as evergreening and double patenting in Indian terms: same inventors, same technical trajectory (long acting GLP‑1), same commercial molecule, split into sequential filings. That was enough to find a credible challenge under Sections 64(1)(a), (e) and (f), despite the patent’s age and global success. Grant alone did not create a presumption of validity. Relief was calibrated. Dr Reddy’s must not sell in India but can manufacture in India and export semaglutide to countries where Novo lacks patent protection, subject to strict accounting. The Court also criticised Reddy’s for not clearing the way with an earlier revocation, signalling that both originators and generics are expected to behave like sophisticated repeat players, not opportunists. The judgment effectively says: platform innovation will be rewarded, but patent portfolio design, including genus and species strategy, filing timelines and internal consistency across jurisdictions, will decide whether follow‑on rights survive scrutiny in India. Novo Nordisk v Dr Reddy’s CS(COMM) 565/2025 Read the judgement copy here.
Registration for logo does not grant automatic protection over underlying words. Simpliciter English letters are inherently descriptive and not entitled to protection: Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has handed down an important decision in Alkem Laboratories Ltd. v. Prevego Healthcare & Research Pvt. Ltd., observing that device marks cannot automatically grant protection over the word or letters comprised therein, unless shown to have acquired secondary meaning. The court held that a registration for a device of the mark ‘A TO Z’ will not offer protection against use of the marks “A TO Z” or “AZ”, since these would be inherently descriptive. The plaintiff claimed that it had adopted and was continuously using its ‘A TO Z’ formative marks in the form of a logo since the year 1998 in respect of pharmaceuticals and nutraceutical products. The plaintiff also owned a couple of registrations for variants of the ‘A TO Z’ device mark (filed in 2007 claiming use since 1998) and for the word mark ‘A TO Z – NS’ (filed in 2008 on proposed to be used basis), in Classes 29 and 30. The plaintiff also asserted copyright in the artistic work of its ‘A TO Z’ device marks. The defendant, on the other hand, was using the mark MULTIVEIN AZ in the form of a logo in respect of health supplements since 2020. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s ‘A TO Z’ device marks conferred exclusivity only in respect of the specific visual representation of the word/letters and not over the underlying letters standalone. The defendant further asserted that term ‘A TO Z’ is a common/generic expression that can signify completeness or range of products to average consumers. The defendant also argued that the marks were different on account of difference in the artistic elements, colour combinations, trade dress, etc. The court dismissed plaintiff’s objections and observed that use of the mark ‘A TO Z’ in relation to multivitamins is likely to indicate that the product consists of different vitamins, such as Vitamin A, B, C, etc., thereby making it descriptive. The court also observed that though ‘A’ and ‘Z’ were the dominant features of the plaintiff’s device mark registrations, the letters ‘A’ and ‘Z’ cannot, of themselves, confer any exclusivity, as this would be violative of the anti-dissection principle. Moreover, the court also found the rival device marks to be different on account of additional figurative elements, difference in the colour scheme, etc. The court also took exception to the Plaintiff concealing that, while defending an opposition by a third-party against one of its applications for the ‘A TO Z’ device marks, the plaintiff had conceded that the mark confers protection only to the device of ‘A TO Z’ as a whole and not specifically to the words. Thus, the Court vacated the interim injunction granted earlier to the Plaintiff and ruled that the Defendant’s MULTIVEIN AZ device mark did not amount to infringement or passing off in relation to the Plaintiff’s ‘A TO Z’ marks. Alkem Laboratories Limited v. Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt. Ltd. [CS(COMM) 84/2025 Read the judgement copy here.